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INTRODUCTION

Terminating a marriage is never a pleasant experience for
the parties involved. Often, the process is laden with emotional
hostility. But, invariably, the process eventually does come to an
end. Or does it? Consider the following letter submitted to Flying Solo, a syndicated column devoted to issues surrounding
divorce:
t J.D., 1997, The Ohio State University College of Law. Special thanks to Associate
Dean Nancy B. Rapoport, whose supervision, support, and encouragement were invaluable. I am also truly grateful to Professor Douglas J. Whaley, Professor Ted Janger, the
Honorable Michael A. Esposito (retired), Douglas E. Curtis, Esq., Lori Fuhrer, the Reverend Steve Wrone, Kendra Sherman, Jim Peltz, Bevin Romans, John Johnston, Corinna
Vaughn, and, of course, Mom and Dad, who, along with many others, helped in countless
ways. Finally, I would like to dedicate this article to my daughter, Shelby, and to the
memory of my sister, Diana Belisle.
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After a bitter divorce proceeding, my husband and I finally reached
an agreement. Because he promised to pay off my automobile, credit card
and charge account debt-$25,000-without tax consequences to me, I
agreed to accept only $350 a month alimony and took a reduced division
of assets.
Not three months after the court order, my husband went to bankruptcy court and dischsrged not only his obligation to pay my debts but
also my property division. This really leaves me holding the bag. I don't
want bad credit, but I can't afford to pay these debts on the $350 a
month alimony he pays me.
Why didn't my lawyer tell me about this?'

In two short paragraphs, this writer has implicated the
enormous and complex issue of the effect a bankruptcy has on a
final decree of divorce. 2 Bankruptcy and domestic relations are
two distinct areas of law, each with its own rules, statutory and
judicial dictates, and jurisdiction. Each also has a distinct underlying policy. The policy underlying the Federal Bankruptcy
Code (the Code) 3 is that of the "fresh start," which gives the
honest but unfortunate debtor a chance to get out from under a
seemingly insurmountable amount of debt and start anew. 4 Domestic relations law, on the other hand, provides a "fair start, "5
1. Jan Warner & Jan Collins Stucker, Flying Solo: Ex-husband's bankruptcy
changed her life, as well, COLUMBUS DisPATCH, April 18, 1996, at 2E.

2. 'Divorce" as it is used in this article refers generically to the termination of a
marriage. It is the point at which a couple is no longer legally married, irrespective of
whether the process involved litigation or was merely an agreement that husband and
wife worked out on their own. Any variance in the terms used by state courts is irrelevant for purposes of this article.
3. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1994 & Supp. I 1995).
4. The policy behind bankruptcy "is to provide honest debtors who have fallen on
hard times the opportunity for a fresh start in life, after they have made a good-faith attempt to pay what they can. This... helps honest debtors from being relegated to a lifetime of destitution or the functional equivalent of financial indentured servitude from
which they can never hope to recove" HR REP. No. 103-835 at 33 (1994), reprinted in
1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3340, 3341.
5. Judge Mike Brigner, Bankruptcy Law (Including the 1994 Code Revisions From a
Domestic Relations Court Perspective) 25 (Feb. 15, 1996) (unpublished manuscript, on
file with the Buffalo Law Review). Judge Brigner describes this objective as follows:
The objective of state divorce laws . . . is to "do equity" between divorcing
spouses, dividing assets, dividing debts, and providing family support based
upon a variety of considerations which are foreign to the Bankruptcy Code,
such as: equitable division of assets and liabilities between spouses, addressing
economic misconduct by one party, immediate disentanglement of financial affairs when possible, providing support to the economically disadvantaged
spouse, requiring beth parents to support their children, forcing unemployed
parents to find work to support their children, compensating one party for sacrificing employment opportunities during the marriage, compensating one
party for enhancing the education and career opportunities of the other spouse,
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allowing two people who have functioned as one economic and
social unit to part ways as equitably and harmoniously as
possible.
These policies collide when one spouse files for bankruptcy
after the marriage has been terminated. At best, the bankruptcy
process causes relitigation and rebalancing of issues already determined in the divorce process. At worst, bankruptcy can void
many, if not all, of the provisions of an otherwise final decree of
divorce. It is this dangerous intersection of bankruptcy and farnily law that I will address.
In this article, I make no claim of gender neutrality. Even
though the mechanics of the bankruptcy process, including determinations regarding the effect on divorce decrees, apply
equally to women and men, a cursory glance at the case law
reveals that this is profoundly a woman's issue because all too
frequently the creditor spouse is female. 6 In general, the availability of bankruptcy's "fresh start" makes it far too easy for the
disgruntled divorce litigant to circumvent the authority of the
state domestic relations court. But even assuming the debtor
does not have improper motives, the present structure of the
Code fails to fully understand the modern reality of marriage
and divorce. The institution of marriage and the people who
comprise it have changed dramatically in recent decades. As is
now well known, the stereotypical nuclear family, in which the
wife forgoes a career to stay home and raise children while her
husband provides financial support, is now an exception rather
than a rule.7 No one can deny that the women's movement has
forced open many doors of opportunity for women, and many
women no longer depend on their husbands for economic surkeeping parties and children off public assistance, and maintaining the standard of living of dependent ex-spouses and minor children.
6. There is precious little statistical data available that adequately addresses the
disparate impact of bankruptcy on women when the debtor is her former spouse. Intuitively, I know that this must be the case, but documenting this truth is well-nigh impossible. The closest we can get is Peter Alexander's study gathering data from 1992 bankruptcy cases in the Central District of Illinois that showed that in 26. of 28 adversary
proceedings concerning dischargeability of marital debts, it was the former husband
seeking discharge. Peter C. Alexander, Divorce and the Dischargeabilityof Debts: Focusing on Women As Creditors in Bankruptcy, 43 CATH. U. L REv. 351, 368 (1994). See also
Jana B. Singer, Divorce Obligationsand Bankruptcy Discharge:Rethinking the Supporti
PropertyDistinction, 30 HARV. J. ON LEGIs. 43, 45 n.5 (1993) [hereinafter Singer I].
7. It is important to point out that many women work outside the home out of economic necessity rather than as a discretionary choice. One study found that the rate of
families living below the poverty line would have been nearly doubled had the wife not
contributed financially to household income. Guess What: Working Wives Aren't to Blame
for the Income Gap, WORKING WOMAN, Dec. 1995, at 16.
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vival. Yet, it is equally undeniable that women are still at a significant financial disadvantage compared to men," and the disparity is perhaps at its greatest when a couple divorces. 9
Divorce has been bluntly described as an economic disaster for
women.10
A post-divorce bankruptcy exacerbates these problems. The
Code and the resulting judicial interpretation seem concurrently
to overestimate the economic opportunities available to women
and underestimate women's economic vulnerability following divorce. Congress is apparently unwilling to protect all domestic
obligations, 1 choosing instead to create unrealistic and unwork8. Although this article is not based on statistical data, some general numbers must
be noted here. Presently, women's average income is only 75 percent of men's; women
with college degrees earn an average of $14.84 per hour, compared to a $19.55 per hour
average for their male counterparts. Diane Harris, Why More Women Say... I Don't
Need Your Money, Honey, MONEY, Nov. 1996, at 148. In spite of increased career opportunities, only 4.3 percent of women earned more than $50,000 per year in 1993. Guess
What, supra note 7, at 16.
9. The most alarming, and now famous, standard of living statistics are those documented in LENO.E J. WEiTmA, THE DivoRcE REVOLUTION, 338-39 (1985). Weitzman's
studies showed a 73 percent decrease in the standard of living for women, compared
with a 42 percent increase for men. Id. Dr. Richard R. Peterson disputes Weitzman's
findings. He claims that, based on Weitzman's own data, the decrease for women is 27
percent, with a 10 percent increase for men. Felicia R. Lee, Influential Study on Divorce's Impact Said to be Flawed, N.Y. TIMEs, May 9, 1996, at C6. Citing a study done by
the NOW Legal Defense Fund, Working Woman magazine reported that in the first year
after a divorce, women suffer a decrease in standard of living of 26 percent, compared to
a 34 percent increase for men. Clint Willis, The 5 Most Expensive Mistakes Women Make.
Special Personal FinanceIssue, WoRKmG WoMAN, Sept. 1995, at 42. Yet another study
found a 45 percent decrease for women versus an increase of 15 percent for men. Harris,
supra note 8, at 153. Although the varied results of these and other studies might justify quibbling among researchers, one unmistakable fact is dear- divorce has greater financial consequences for women than for men.
10. See generally Katherine K. Baker, Comment, Contractingfor Security: Paying
MarriedWomen What They've Earned, 55 U. Cm. L REv. 1193, 1193 (1988) (citing James
B. McLindon, Separate But Unequal: The Economic Disaster of Divorce for Women and
Children, 21 FAn LQ. 351 (1987)).
11. See David M. Susswein, Divorce Related PropertyDivision v. Alimony, Maintenance, and Support in the Bankruptcy Context: A Distinction Without a Difference?, 22
HoFSmA L REv. 679 (1994). According to Susswein, when Congress was debating what
became the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, it appointed a commission to analyze and
update bankruptcy law. Among its recommendations, the commission proposed that all
domestic debts be excepted from discharge. Congress rejected this proposal, adopting instead the present §523(aX5), which excepts only debts for support of the debtor's child or
former spouse. Ironically, the main opposition to the commission's proposal came from
bankruptcy judges themselves. A proposal submitted by the National Conference of
Bankruptcy Judges helped persuade Congress that only support obligations should outweigh the debtor's fresh start. Id. at 681-83.
In 1990, Representative Henry Hyde introduced the Property Settlement Integrity
Act of 1990, which would have made non-dischargeable all domestic property distribu-
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able exceptions that seem to protect only those creditor spouses
who demonstrate a more traditional economic dependence on
their former husbands. Given the remarkable disparity in standards of living of men and women following divorce, many women do in fact remain dependent in the short term. But their
dependence is not on their former husbands; rather, it is on the
enforceability of the provisions of the divorce decree. The ease
with which those provisions can be undone in bankruptcy elevates the fresh start principle too far above the fair start sought
by the domestic relations court.
This article explores how the mechanisms and interpretations of the Code create a system that is fundamentally unfair
to the creditor spouse. Part I provides a general roadmap to the
intersection at which the policies of bankruptcy and domestic relations collide, and briefly describes the specific provisions of the
Code discussed in this article. Part II is a discussion of the
bankruptcy exception to discharge for what are euphemistically
called "support" obligations. It emphasizes the failure of the
Code and the courts to fully appreciate the structure and function of modem divorce decrees. Part HI provides a comprehensive analysis of the Code's new exception to discharge of domestic debts, especially its procedural and interpretative difficulties.
Part IV takes a new approach to examining divorce obligations
in bankruptcy, arguing that the fraud exception to discharge can
and should be applied to certain divorce decrees. Part V is my
solution, offering Congress two alternatives to correct the injustice it has created.
I. THE DECREE AND THE DISCHARGE GENERALLY
Marriage termination is exclusively a matter of state law.12
Couples terminate their marriages through a judicial decree of
divorce, regardless of whether a judge or the parties themselves
are responsible for the creation of the terms of the divorce. The
tions. This amendment, combined with the § 523(aX5) exception for support obligations,
would have achieved the goal sought by the 1978 commission: to disallow discharge in
bankruptcy of any obligations arising from a divorce. Of course, Rep. Hyde's proposed
legislation met the same fate as the commission's recommendations. Id at 691. See also
Singer I, supra note 6.
By enacting § 523(aX15) in 1994, Congress finally brought more than support obligations under the protective umbrella of non-dischargeability. But, as I discuss in Part
I, infra, the property settlement exception provides little actual protection for the creditor spouse.
12. DeSylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570, 580 (1956) ("there is no federal law of domestic relations, which is primarily a matter of state concern).
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details of a divorce decree are as varied as the people involved;
however, they all serve the purpose of dividing up everything
that was a part of the marriage, from custodial arrangements
for the children to the paper plates the couple once kept for
barbecues with friends. For many people, the divorce decree represents the conclusion to a painful chapter in their lives-a marriage that has gone bad is finally over. For some, though, it provides little more than an intermission, a chance to take a quick
breath and collect their energy for the battles that lie aheadthis time in bankruptcy court.13
Post-divorce bankruptcy proceedings will involve a determination of the dischargeability of the financial obligations created
in the decree. Put simply, a discharge of debt means that the
debtor is no longer legally liable for his financial obligations,
and creditors no longer have a right to collect on the debts. 14
Generally speaking, the divorce decree will contain two types of
financial rights and obligations between the former spouses that
will be affected by the bankruptcy proceeding. The first type involves monetary obligations requiring payment from one spouse
to the other. For example, a divorce decree might award the
marital home to the debtor spouse, with that spouse making a
cash payment to the other for one-half of the home's equity. Discharge of this direct payment type of debt means that the creditor spouse will receive nothing.
The second type, called a "hold harmless agreement," concerns monetary obligations to third parties, i.e., debt incurred
jointly during the marriage, such as credit cards, that the debtor
spouse assumes through the divorce decree. Discharge of this
type of obligation has more severe consequences for the creditor
spouse because the third party legally can-and likely will-require her to pay the debt. Agreements between spouses in a divorce decree do nothing to disturb the original joint obligation to
the third party, and, if the debt is discharged, the creditor
spouse remains liable for its payment, with no recourse against
the debtor for reimbursement of the payment.h
13. The consequence of a post-divorce bankruptcy involves far more than a disruption of financial affairs. Judge Koger eloquently stated the emotional aspect of a proceed-

ing which "requires bankruptcy courts to revisit, in excruciating detail, the anger, the
bitterness, and the pain which [both parties] have felt and now feel .... [One could almost see the old wounds being reopened and new and more expensive scars being inflicted upon both parties." Silvers v. Silvers (In re Silvers), 187 B.R. 648, 648 (Bankr.
W.D. Mo. 1995).
14. 11 U.S.C. § 524 (1994).
15. One could argue that the creditor spouse was liable all along for the debt because she agreed at the time of contracting to be jointly liable with the person who was
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The simplistic definition of the word "discharge" given above
belies its complexity. The Bankruptcy Code, in keeping with the
concept of the fresh start, begins with the idea that the individual debtor may rid himself of all his financial obligations. It
then excepts certain types of debt, 16 which means that if a particular obligation falls within one of the categories set out by
Congress as nondischargeable, the debtor will still be liable to
pay it in full once the. bankruptcy is over.
The Code contains two discharge exceptions that apply to
the obligations contained in a divorce decree. The first is
§ 523(a)(5), which states that a discharge in bankruptcy does
not release the debtor from obligations that are in the nature of
alimony, maintenance, or support. 17 This exception protects
then her spouse. This too summarily dismisses the post-marital reality of the creditor
spouse. For example, the domestic relations court could have ordered that the debtor indemnify the creditor spouse on their joint obligations because the creditor spouse would
lack the financial resources to pay the debt once the marriage was terminated. Moreover, until the bankruptcy, the creditor spouse was never solely liable on the debt owed to
a third party, had the couple remained married, it is quite likely that his income would
have gone toward paying the bill along with hers.
16. These exceptions, found at 11 U.S.C. § 523(a), represent a policy determination
by Congress that certain types of obligations either "fail to meet the bankruptcy objective of giving a fresh start only to honest debtors or are considered to be of paramount
societal importance (such as tax obligations, and alimony and child support)2' HR REP.
No. 103-835, at 34 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.CAN. 3342.
17. Section 523(aX5) excepts from discharge a debt:
to a spouse, former spouse, or child of the debtor, for alimony to, maintenance
for, or support of such spouse or child, in connection with a separation agreement, divorce decree or other order of a court of record, determination made in
accordance with State or territorial law by a governmental unit, or property
settlement agreement, but not to the extent that:
(A) such debt is assigned to another entity, voluntarily, by operation of law, or
otherwise (other than debts assigned pursuant to section 402(aX26) of the Social Security Act, or any such debt which has been assigned to the Federal
Government or to a State or any political subdivision of such State); or
(B) such debt includes a liability designated as alimony, maintenance, or support, unless such liability is actually in the nature of alimony, maintenance or
support.
11 U.S.C. § 523(aX5) (1994). Congress amended § 523(aX5XA), so that it now reads:
(A) such debt is assigned to another entity, voluntarily, by operation of law, or
otherwise (other than debts assigned pursuant to section 402(aX26) of the Social Security Act, or any such debt which has been assigned to the Federal
Government or to a State or any political subdivision of such State).
Congress further added a new exception to discharge, §523(aX18), which excepts a debt:
(18) owed under State law to a State or municipality that is(A) in the nature of support, and
(B) enforceable under part D of title IV of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C.
601 et seq.)
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, 104 PL. 193,
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what we traditionally think of as alimony or child support. A determination that an obligation is, in fact, in the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support means that the obligation is
nondischargeable without further analysis.
Section 523(a)(15), enacted as part of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, excepts from discharge property settlements
and hold harmless agreements18 in the decree that are not actually in the nature of support. 19 Prior to the enactment of
§ 523(a)(15), a judicial determination that a debt was in the nature of a property settlement, rather than for maintenance or
support, meant that the debt would be discharged. This is because the only exception available to the creditor spouse was the
"either-or" provision of § 523(a)(5). Congress sought to alleviate
the sometimes harsh result of the either-or choice by allowing
discharge of nonsupport provisions of the decree, but only under
certain circumstances. If the debtor is unable to pay the debts
from income not reasonably necessary for his own maintenance
or support, or if the benefit of discharge to the debtor is greater
than the detrimental consequences to the creditor spouse, the
§ 374, 110 Stat. 2105 (enacted Aug. 21, 1996).
The change to § 523(aX5XA) and the addition of § 523(a)(18) represent a small element of the federal governments increasing involvement in the collection of child support from "deadbeat dadsr My concern in this article is with spousal support, and my
emphasis throughout is the effect that the interplay between divorce and bankruptcy
has on the creditor spouse. I do not mean to imply that child support is not worthy of
discussion; it is. However, child support and spousal support are moving in separate directions and their character is of each is becoming increasingly distinct. While spouses
are seeking to disentangle themselves as quickly and as fully as possible, child support
has become a matter of national attention and is now the focus of many varied statutory
enactments. Discussing child support as such here would involve detailed review of the
various statutes at both the state and federal level, a review that is beyond the scope of
this article.
18. Although these two types of obligations are distinct, they are very commonly referred to generically as 'property settlement7 obligations.
19. Section 523(a)(15) excepts from discharge a debt:
not of the kind described in paragraph (5) that is incurred by the debtor in the
course of a divorce or separation or in connection with a separation agreement,
divorce decree or other order of a court of record, a determination made in accordance with State or territorial law by a governmental unit unless:
(A) the debtor does not have the ability to pay such debt from income or property of the debtor not reasonably necessary to be expended for the maintenance
or support of the debtor or a dependent of the debtor and, if the debtor is engaged in a business, for the payment of expenditures necessary for the continuation, preservation, and operation of such business; or
(B) discharging such debt would result in a benefit to the debtor that outweighs the detrimental consequences to a spouse, former spouse, or child of the
debtor.
11 US.C. § 523(aX15) (1994).
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debt will still be discharged. Thus, § 523(a)(15) involves a rebalancing of the interests of both the debtor and creditor spouse.
In addition to the specific marital exceptions, creditor
spouses have also sought to prevent discharge of domestic debts
under § 523(a)(2)(A), which excepts from discharge debts incurred through the debtor's use of misrepresentations, false pretenses, or actual fraud. 20 This infrequently argued exception
usually arises in the context of a bankruptcy that follows on the
heels of the entry of the divorce decree in the state domestic relations court. Where little time has elapsed between the two,
the creditor spouse may argue that the decree itself was entered
into by the debtor
with no intention on his part to pay the obli21
gations therein.
II.

SECTION 523(A)(5):

OBLIGATIONS ACTUALLY IN THE NATURE OF SUPPORT

Section 523(a)(5) excepts from discharge payments that are
actually in the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support.
Though not as textually troublesome as § 523(a)(15), the interpretative difficulties of § 523(a)(5) are equally pervasive. In
nearly twenty years of judicial analysis, no standard has been
articulated that adequately answers the principal question at issue: when is a domestic obligation actually in the nature of
support?
Congress provided no definition of "support," and even if it
had, that definition may no longer be relevant, because our gen20. Section 523(aX2XA) excepts from discharge any debt for money, property, services, or an extension, renewal, or refinancing of credit, the extent obtained by false pretenses, a false representation, or actual fraud, other than a statement respecting the
debtor's or an insider's financial condition.
11 U.S.C. § 523(aX2XA) (1994).
21. I do not mean to imply that no other exceptions to discharge would be applicable to the debtor's domestic obligations. When the circumstances warrant, other exceptions provided for in § 523(a) have been argued, and some creditor spouses have sought
a general denial of the debtor's discharge under § 727(a). However, these arguments appear only sporadically in the case law. My decision to include cases argued under the
fraud exception is based primarily on what appears to be judicial unwillingness to examine fraud in the marital context as it would in any other financial transaction. Moreover, I believe the fraud exception to be increasingly relevant as more couples negotiate
at least some part of their decree on their own. In this sense, the decree is much more
in the nature of a financial contract. For a survey discussion of arguments raised by
creditor spouses to either except specific debts from discharge, or to deny the debtor the
bankruptcy relief he seeks, see Claude . Bowles & Jessica B. Allman, What the Bankruptcy Code Giveth, CongressTaketh Away: The Dischargeabilityof Domestic Obligations
After the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, 34 U. LOU.SVILLE J. FAM. L 521, 599-608
(1996).
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eral notions of support have changed radically since the 1970s.
Until recently, "support" commonly represented a husband's obligation to provide financially for his wife even after the marriage ended (through alimony payments), and the alimony
award was entirely distinct from property divisions, which were
not designed to serve as financial support.2 2 Congress might
have had this traditional type of alimony in mind in 1978 when
it enacted § 523(a)(5). Since the 1970s, however, the distributive
systems in divorce have significantly changed:
Today, almost every state uses a system of equitable distribution in place
of alimony, and the practice of no-fault is commonplace. Under equitable
distribution several factors, all relating to the needs of the spouses and
fairness in dividing marital gains and losses, are used to produce a property settlement or divorce decree. While apportioning gains and losses is
a stated goal of equitable distribution, the support policies of alimony
along with the corresponding focus on the needs of the parties remains
2
an integral part of equitable distribution statutes.m

Thus, the central inquiry under § 523(a)(5)-what constitutes support-is plagued by an astonishing lack of clarity. Although support still exists as a component of divorce for the financially disadvantaged spouse, its character has changed from
a distinct and definable provision to a factor that is considered
in formulating an overall distribution to each party. A postdivorce bankruptcy gives rise to an obvious tension-the Code
requires the bankruptcy courts to draw the very distinction that
has been all but erased in the domestic relations forum.
Although the bankruptcy courts must draw the distinction
between support and property settlements, the Code itself is of

little assistance in accomplishing this task. The term "support"
is not defined, but the statutory framework of the Code does not
appear to allow alimony, maintenance, or support to be defined
22. Susswein, supra note 11, at 685. Alimony arose out of the duty of a husband to
support his wife. The duty usually took the form of monthly payments continuing indefinitely until death or the wife's remarriage, when her new husband would assume the
duty of support. Since no-fault divorce did not exist, a husband had the duty to support
his ex-wife if he was at fault for allowing the marriage to dissolve. Conversely, if his
wife was at fault for the failure of the marriage, she was not entitled to alimony. Therefore, alimony was originally punitive in nature. The purpose was to provide for the ongoing needs of the wife, as and such, alimony was purely forward-looking. Since alimony
was need-based, a change in the circumstances of either spouse permitted the state
court to modify the alimony obligations to reflect the changed circumstances. Id. (internal citations omitted). For an eye-opening discussion of the relative scarcity of alimony
awards under the old fault-based system, see Jana B. Singer, Divorce Reform and Gender Justice, 67 N.C. L. RV. 1103, 1106-08 (1989) [hereinafter Singer I].
23. Susswein, supra note 11, at 686.
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in terms of reasonableness.2 It is clear that whether an obligation is actually in the nature of support is a matter of federal
law, as demonstrated by the legislative history of § 523(a)(5); 25
thus, bankruptcy courts may not rely on the definition from the
state having jurisdiction over the decree. 26 Because there is no
federal statutory or common law of domestic relations, 27 the
bankruptcy courts have been required to formulate a workable
framework within which they can properly analyze and characterize the nature of the various provisions of the decree. The
majority of courts have required at least some showing that the
parties intended to create a support obligation at the time of divorce.28 But the intent of the parties is as imprecise as the decree itself. The troubling nature of this characterization has
been aptly stated in one treatise:
With rare exceptions, the line between settlement and support payments
will be faint, irregular and blurred. Partly this arises from the recipients
indifference to the nature of the payment. Money is money in the hands
of the recipient, and (apart from possible tax consequences) the recipient
has no interest in deciding whether this payment is alimony or whether
it is a payment in settlement of some other property claim.
Of course, the taxability of such payments may cause parties to label
them, but beyond that both husband and wife are likely to be much more
24. The presence of the qualifier 'reasonable" in other provisions of the Code leads
to the conclusion that Congress did not intend to so qualify support in § 523(aX5). Other
provisions of the Code that mention "alimony, maintenance or support" specifically provide for only a reasonable amount thereof For example, § 522(dX1OXD), part of the federal exemption scheme, allows a debtor to exempt from property of the estate his right
to receive "alimony, support, or separate maintenance, to the extent reasonably necessary for the support of the debtor and any dependent of the debtor."
Also, where Congress refers to 'reasonable support" it relates to the debtor. Congress would have difficulty justifying use of the 'reasonable" qualifier in § 523(aX5) because it would create an express mandate that the bankruptcy courts modify state domestic relations court orders, an obviously improper function. However, as I demonstrate
in this article, the Codes treatment of domestic obligations generally allows, perhaps
even requires, such modification.
25. S. REP. No. 95-989, at 79 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5865
('What constitutes alimony, maintenance, or support will be determined under the bankruptcy law, not State law.); see also HR. RsP. No. 95-595, at 364 (1978), reprinted in
1978 US.C.CJA.N. 5963, 6320.
26. See Dennis v. Dennis (In re Dennis), 25 F.3d 274,279 (5th Cir. 1994) (Mne bankruptcy court had neither the option nor the authority to apply state law.... ).
27. DeSylva v. Ballentin, 351 US. 570, 580 (1956) (MThere is no federal law of domestic relations, which is primarily a matter of state concern.").
28. See, eg., Gianakas v. Gianakas (In re Gianakas), 917 F.2d 759, 762-63 (3d Cir.
1990); Sylvester v. Sylvester, 865 F2d 1164, 1166 (10th Cir. 1989); Shaver v. Shaver, 736
F.2d 1314, 1316-17 (9th Cir. 1984); Long v. Calhoun (In re Calhoun), 715 F.2d 1103, 1109
(6th Cir. 1983).

380

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45

interested in amount than in characterization. In any event, both are
principally interested in the net economic consequence of the divorce
settlement.P

Although the circuits vary with respect to the determination
of intent, there are some principles on which the courts generally agree. The first is that "support" is not limited to direct
payments from one spouse to the other; it can include both payments to the creditor spouse and those obligations to third parties for which the debtor is responsible under the decree30 This
means that the debtor's obligation to pay a third party-for example, a hold harmless agreement or an award of attorney's fees
incurred by the creditor spouse in conjunction with the divorce
proceedings-can be interpreted as actually in the nature of
support for the creditor spouse.31 The mere fact that payment is
not made directly to the creditor spouse does not destroy the
support character of a domestic obligation.
Another commonly recognized principle is that the substance of the decree will govern its form.32 As courts of equity,
29. Collins v. Hesson (In re Hesson), 190 B.R. 229, 233 (Bankr. D. Md. 1995) (quotT AL, BAuNmRUFT,
§ 7-29 (1992)).
30. See Calhoun, 715 F.2d at 1107 ("Bankruptcy courts have uniformly found hold
harmless clauses to create nondischargeable obligations."). This uniform holding is supported in the legislative history of § 523(aX5) as well:
The Proviso, however, makes non-dischargeable any debts resulting from an
agreement by the debtor to hold the debtor's spouse harmless, on joint debts,
to the extent that the agreement is in payment of alimony, maintenance, or
support of the spouse, as determined under bankruptcy law considerationsas to
whether a particularagreement to pay money to a spouse is actually alimony or
a property settlement.
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting S. BP. No. 95-989, at 79 (1978), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.CA.N. 5865); see also HR BEP. No. 95-595, at 364 (1978), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.CA.N. 6320.
Notwithstanding this well established principle, the recently enacted § 523(aX15)
seems to contemplate a different result. In attempting to explain the applicability of
§ 523(aX15), the legislative history implies that hold harmless agreements (and "pure"
property settlements) that are accepted by the creditor spouse in exchange for a reduced
alimony or child support award are not support at all. See Bankruptcy Reform Act of
1994, HR BEP. No. 103-394, at 54 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.CA.N. 3340, 3363.
31. See Joseph v. O'Toole (In re Joseph), 16 F.3d 86, 88 (5th Cir. 1994). The Joseph
court stated that "[an attorney's fee award granted pursuant to a divorce decree does
not elude discharge because it tangentially relates to an award of support and maintenance; rather, the attorney's fee award is deemed nondischargeable if the award itself
reflects a balancing of the parties' financial needs Id.
32. See Melichar v. Ost (In re Melichar), 661 E2d 300, 303 (4th Cir. 1981), in which
the court stated:
We do not doubt that classification of an agreement under state law is an important factor in determining if the parties intended an agreement to provide
for the payment of alimony within the meaning of § 35(a)(7) [of the Bank-
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the bankruptcy courts may look beyond such labels as "alimony"
or "property settlement" in order to determine the true substance of the various provisions of the decree. The language of
§ 523(a)(5) requires as much, in that it allows discharge of provisions "designated as alimony, maintenance, or support, unless
such liability is actually" support as determined by the court.3
The courts might consider such labels as a factor in the overall
analysis,3 but the labels are not dispositive.
Analyzing the substance rather than the form of the decree
is a necessity, as there may be a variety of reasons that particular labels have been attached to the provisions of the decree. For
instance, the parties may have drafted their decree themselves
or used a commercially available form document. In addition,
the bankruptcy courts' disregard of labels helps to alleviate the
variances in state law with respect to alimony statutes, thereby
creating, at least in theory, a uniform standard in the bankruptcy courts.3 The relevant inquiry is whether a distribution
labeled as property settlement masks the reason behind the distribution-that one spouse was awarded certain property because the court, or the parties themselves, deemed that property
essential to the recipient spouse's support. Focusing on the substance of the decree serves to uncover whether the parties intended the various provisions of their decree to be support provisions. The extent to which the courts actually spend time
classifying the divorce decree provisions is questionable. For example, in In re Phillips, the court disregarded the label "lump
ruptcy Act, now § 523(aX5)]. But we do not foreclose the possibility that the
agreement may be a hybrid of two means of paying alimony recognized by
state law, and the fact that it combines features of both does not automatically
destroy the nature of the payments as alimony.
This was recognized as far back as 1975 in In re Nunnally, 506 F2d 1024, 1027 (5th Cir.
1975), where the court stated that "support in the future can play a significant role in
the divorce court's property division and that what may appear to be a mere division of
assets may in fact... contain a substantial element of alimony substitute, support or
maintenance, however termed." See also Dennis v. Dennis (In re Dennis), 25 F.3d 274,
n.5 (5th Cir. 1994) (That substance shall govern form "is not only a clearly established
principle in this Circuit, but no other circuit to review this issue has ever taken a contrary view.) (citations omitted).
33. 11 US.C. § 523(aX5)(BX1994).
34. See Friedkin v. Sternberg (In re Sternberg), 85 F.3d 1400, 1405 (9th Cir. 1996);
Forsdick v. Turgeon, 812 F.2d 801, 803 (2d Cir. 1987); Robb-Fulton v. Robb (In re Robb),
23 F.3d 895, 899 (4th Cim 1994).
35. See, ag., Joseph, 16 F.3d at 87-88 (because permanent alimony does not exist
under Texas law, court "must place substance over form to determine the true nature
and purpose of the award, regardless of the label used"); Shaver v. Shaver, 736 F.2d
1314, 1316 (9th Cir. 1984) (court not bound by Indiana statute allowing alimony only
where spouse is incapacitated or when parties agree in writing to an award of alimony).
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sum alimony" because the provision so labeled was included in
the "equitable distribution" portion of the decree.3 6 Thus, the
court merely preferred one label over the other. More important,
because bankruptcy courts require an intention to provide support in varying degrees, parties have responded by inserting
language into the decree that is indicative of their intent. The
parties' use of explanatory language in the decree is an important and positive development because it may help insulate a
creditor spouse from the potentially devastating effects of a subsequent bankruptcy filing by her former spouse.37 The problem
is that this strategy tends to shift the focus back onto the decree
itself, making the labels and structure of the document increasingly important in the overall analysis.
Related to the labels in the decree, some courts will also
look at the debtor's subsequent treatment of the obligation, invoking the doctrine of quasi-estoppel. This doctrine estops a
party from asserting in bankruptcy that an obligation is either
support or a property settlement if the party previously benefitted from an inconsistent characterization of the obligation. The
court in In re Robb, for example, reasoned that the debtor
should be estopped from arguing that a monthly payment to his
former spouse was a property settlement because he classified
those payments as alimony for tax purposes and deducted the
amounts paid from his gross income. The extent to which the
parties' treatment of an obligation will control is uncertain. For
example, one court was not convinced that the debtor's use of
"maintenance" as a payment reference on some of his personal
records demonstrated his intent that his financial obligations to
his former spouse were in the nature of support. 39 Moreover,
courts may be more hesitant to invoke the doctrine of quasiestoppel against the creditor spouse when the debtor presents
evidence that she benefitted by not paying the tax.4°
In determining whether the provisions of a decree are actually support, most courts consider the intent of the parties to be
36. Phillips v. Phillips (In re Phillips), 187 B.R& 363, 367 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1995).

37. See John F. Murphy, The Dischargeabilityin Bankruptcy of Debts for Alimony
and PropertySettlements Arising from Divorce, 14 PEPP. L. REV.69, 79 (1986) (advising
practitioners to draft decrees that expressly state that the relevant provisions are intended by the parties as support under § 523(a)(5)); Brigner, supra note 5, at 41-42 (suggested separation agreement language for practitioners).
38. Robb, 23 F.3d at 898-99. See also, Sampson v. Sampson (In re Sampson), 997
F.2d 717, 724 (10th Cir. 1993).
39. Slingerland v. Slingerland (In re Slingerland), 87 B.R. 981, 985 (Bankr.S.D. Ml1.
1988).
40. Kritt v. Kritt (In re Kritt), 190 B.R. 382, 388-89 (BAR 9th Cir. 1995).
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decisive, 41 or at least an important element.42 For the present
purposes, this distinction is of little consequence. 43 Most federal
courts of appeals have addressed the issue, but the circuits are
not in agreement as to the proper treatment of domestic obligations under § 523(a)(5). Both within and among the circuits,
§ 523(a)(5) analysis is fraught with inconsistency even in cases
with substantially similar fact patterns. 44 A number of commentators have discussed the varying approaches and problems
under § 523(a)(5) and I find it unnecessary to duplicate their
thorough analyses here. There are, however, certain aspects
41. Robb, 23 .3d at 898; Brody v. Brody (In re Brody), 3 F3d 35, 38 (2d Cir. 1993);
Gianakas v. Gianakas (In re Gianakas), 917 F.2d 759, 762 (3d Cir. 1990); Benich v.
Benich (In re Benich), 811 F.2d 943, 945 (5th Cir. 1987); Boyle v. Donovan, 724 E2d 681,
683 (8th Cir. 1984); Shaver v. Shaver, 736 F2d 1314, 1316 (9th Cir. 1984).
42. The Tenth Circuit, for example, uses a two-part test that requires the court to
first determine whether the parties intended that the decree provide support followed by
an examination of the substantive function the provisions served at the time the decree
was entered. Young v.Young (In re Young), 35 E3d 499, 500 (10th Cir. 1994) (citing In re
Sampson, 997 F.2d 717).
In the Sixth Circuit, the intent of the parties is the first prong in a three part test.
Long v. Calhoun (In re Calhoun), 715 F2d 1103 (6th Cir. 1983). If the intent requirement
is not met, the inquiry ends and the debt is dischargeable. Id. at 1109. If intent is found,
the case proceeds to the second prong of the analysis, whether the obligation has the actual effect of providing support. Id. As with intent, if the creditor spouse fails to carry
her burden on this point, the inquiry ends. Id. The final determination for the court is
whether the amount of support is "manifestly unreasonable under traditional concepts of
support! Id. at 1110. If so, the court must discharge that portion of the obligation that
exceeds this standard of reasonableness. Id.
43. Susswein, supra note 11, at 692-93. Suggesting that the distinction is of little
consequence generally, Susswein calls the "intent test" a misnomer, stating:.
If the courts used a true intent test, they would simply use the words and labels in the agreement or decree to determine whether an award was meant to
be alimony, maintenance, or support. Instead, in determining the intent of the
parties or state court judge, the bankruptcy court looks at the circumstances at
the time of the divorce. If the obligation was reasonably necessary to maintain
the spouse's needs, it will be characterized as non-dischargeable support; if not,
it will be treated as dischargeable property division. Therefore, the intent test
is actually a "function" or "needs" test.
Id.
44. For an excellent discussion of the inconsistent results arising from § 523(a)(5)
analysis, see Alexander, supra note 6, at 375-88.
45. Susswein, supra note 11; Alexander, supra, note 6; Singer I, supra note 6 (arguing that the support/property settlement distinction can no longer be justified and that
Congress should amend the Code to except all domestic obligations); Patricia A. Cullen,
Note, Does Anybody Know the Rules in FederalDivorce Court?: A Case for Revision of
Bankruptcy Code § 523, 46 RUTGES L REV. 427 (1993) (discussing historical evolution of
alimony, property settlements and the bankruptcy exception for support obligations, urging that Congress amend the Code to except all debts arising from a state domestic relations order); Murphy, supra note 37 (discussing various approaches taken by courts to
determine whether obligations in a decree are actually in the nature of support, conclud-
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that warrant some attention here. Irrespective of the basis of
the inquiry, whether intent or function, courts commonly use various factors in deciding whether an obligation is actually support, some of which are woefully inadequate to the task.
A useful starting point is In re Calhoun, which was among
the first decisions by a federal court of appeals, because it has
been an important case in the overall development of § 523(a)(5)
jurisprudence.4 Notwithstanding its highly criticized examination of the parties' financial circumstances at the time of the
bankruptcy, Calhoun seems to have laid the foundation for
§ 523(a)(5) analysis. Calhoun adopted a test that examines
whether the parties intended that the decree provide support,
whether the obligations presently provide support, and whether
the amount of the obligation is manifestly unreasonable under
traditional notions of support.47
Calhoun itself does not elaborate on how a court is to determine whether the parties intended to create a support obligation. Instead, it broadly states that the "bankruptcy court may
consider any relevant evidence."" Nonetheless, in determining
whether the obligations are manifestly unreasonable, the court
found relevant "such traditional state law factors as the relative
earning powers of the parties, their financial status, prior work
experience or abilities, other means of support and
other facts
49
relevant to the substance of the result achieved."
ing that the best approach is to have parties specifically express their intentions in the
decree itself); Angela M. Gottsche, COMMENT, Striking the Mean Between the Goals of
Bankruptcy and Divorce: Developing a Standard for the Classificationof Domestic Obligations Under § 523(a)(5) of the Bankruptcy Code, 7 BANK. DEv. J. 565 (1990) (surveying approaches taken in each circuit with extensive review of Calhoun doctrine in the
Sixth Circuit); Bowles & Allman, supra note 21, at 562-599 (broad summary discussion
of many issues arising in § 523(a)(5) cases).
46. Long v. Calhoun (In re Calhoun), 715 F.2d 1103 (6th Cir. 1983). For more detailed discussions of Calhoun, see William Houston Brown, The Impact of Bankruptcy on
Alimony, Maintenance, and Support Obligations: The Approach in the Sixth Circuit, 56
TENN. L REv. 507, 508 (1989) (designed to "provide practitioners with an analysis of the
law and practice requirements within only the Sixth Circuif). Judge Brown's article was
written prior to the Sixth Circuits decision in Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald (In re Fitzgerald),
9 F.3d 517 (6th Cir. 1993), which appears to limit application of the "present needs" test
to domestic obligations "not denominated as support in the divorce decree." Id. at 521.
For a discussion of the Sixth Circuit's post-Calhoun decisions, see Ellen B. Vergos, Bankruptcy Issues Arising in Divorce Practice, 24 MEm ST. U. L. Rav. 697 (1994).
47. Calhoun, 715 F.2d at 1109-10. If a court finds the obligation to be "manifestly
unreasonable," the court must "set a reasonable limit on the nondischargeability of that
obligation." Id. at 1110.
48. Id. at 1109.
49. Id. at 1110.
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Similar factors appear in most subsequent cases, but courts
have added more over time, believing the additional factors necessary to a proper determination of whether an obligation is actually in the nature of support.50 Common among these lists are
factors relating to the duration of the obligation and the form of
its payment. For example, courts often consider whether an obligation is payable in installments that are spread over time
rather than in a lump sum because they believe the former to
be more indicative of a support obligation. Similarly, courts tend
to believe that when an obligation is subject to contingencies
such as the recipients death or remarriage, the obligation is
more likely to be in the nature of support.5 ' This line of inquiry
is misguided. Factors such as these are merely characteristic of
the traditional notions of spousal support; they indicate little
more than the fact that the support was to be paid in a more
traditional fashion. Use of traditional factors frustrates the task
of determining whether an obligation actually is support, because it maintains the focus on an outmoded divorce distribution scheme. The modern trend in divorce is to terminate the
marriage as completely as possible, but also in a way that allows the financially dependent spouse to become economically
self-sufficient as soon as possible. 2 Because long-term, monthly
alimony payments stand in the way of that goal, support is increasingly being awarded through the division of marital assets
and debt. Also, the significant role that hold harmless agreements often play in providing support gets downplayed. At the
individual level, there may be any number of reasons that the
creditor spouse agreed to a lump sum payment,53 if she thought
about it at all,5 and she should not be penalized for accepting
payment in a less traditional form. A court's insistent search for
the characteristics of traditional alimony undercuts the strength
50. Phillips v. Phillips (In re Phillips), 187 B.&. 363, 367 (MD. Fla. 1995) (six factors); Wolfe v. McCartin (In re McCartin), No. 95-16195-JNF, 1996 US. Bankr. LEXIS
1707, at *14-15 (D. Mass. Nov. 19, 1996) (seven factors); Stone v. Stone (In re Stone), 79
B.R. 633, 638 (Bankr. D. Md. 1987) (18 factors).
51. E.g., Sterna v. Paneras (In re Paneras), 195 BR. 395, 401-02 (Bankr. NM). Ill.
1996).
52. Singer I, supra note 6, at 79-80.
53. For example, the creditor spouse might -have insisted that support be paid in
one lump sum installment because it would reduce the cost and inconvenience to her in
the event the obligor defaults. Typically, she would only be able to sue for amounts actually in default. If the payments were spread over time, the creditor spouse would have to
go through the collection process over and over in order to collect what she is owed. Although not inconvenient, the collection process is much easier when there is only one
payment on which the obligor can default.
54. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
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with which nearly all bankruptcy courts assert that the substance of a decree will govern its form, for this practice merely
displaces the examination to the form of the payment.
Many courts also consider as a factor whether the creditor
spouse was in need of support at the time the parties divorced.
Support, as a concept, has come to mean one of two things
under § 523(a)(5). The first definition relates to the creditor
spouse's standard of living during marriage and the extent to
which the obligations in the decree are necessary to her maintaining a similar standard of living. The second is a "bread and
water"6 definition, which focuses on whether the obligations are
necessary for the creditor spouse to sustain her daily needs such
as food, shelter, and transportation.
Although the concept of support might appear to be simple
at first glance, what one needs for support is highly subjective.
The Calhoun decision has given rise to a body of law that defines the need for support in terms of basic subsistence. The
Calhoun court, in considering whether an obligation that was
intended to provide support continues to serve that function, described need as the creditor spouse's ability to "maintain the
daily necessities, such as food, housing and transportation."5
The bread and water standard has been followed in many cases.
Citing Calhoun, the court in In re Yeates 57 stated that an obligation that is necessary for the creditor spouse to maintain daily
necessities indicates that the parties intended the obligation to
provide support. 58 In another case, the court discharged the
debtor's domestic obligations because the creditor spouse did not
show any "unusual drains on her income" and, thus, she did not
have a "compelling need for support to meet daily needs.5 9 The
court in In re Newman 6° took an even stricter view:
While it is evident that [the creditor spouse] needs transportation and
there is no public transportation available in the area... she is [able] to

keep up the payments not necessarily on this automobile, but on a less
expensive automobile. The children are within walking distance of the
school, except for rare visits to the doctor they are not in need of
55. Bowles &Allnan, supra note 21, at 588.
56. Long v. Calhoun (In re Calhoun), 715 F.2d 1103, 1109 (6th Cir. 1983).
57. Yeates v. Yeates (In re Yeates), 807 E2d 874 (10th Cir. 1986).
58. Id. at 879.
59. Hall v. Hall (In re Hall), 40 BIL 204, 206 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1984). Other than
significant medical problems or heavy personal debt, the court did not indicate what
would constitute an "unusual drain" that compelled a need for support. I&
60. Newman v. Newman (In re Newman), 15 BL 67 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1981).
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transport.6 '

Not all courts exhibit such a harsh view of support. Some
courts consider support necessary when it balances in the relative income of the parties. 62 In In re Goin, the court found the
debtor's obligations nondischargeable because without them the
creditor spouse would have insufficient income to maintain the
standard of living to which she and her children had become accustomed. s A standard that is not limited to basic subsistence is
clearly more appropriate because it allows support to be measured in a way that acknowledges the authority of the state domestic relations court orders, rather than rendering meaningless
the equitable division sought in divorce proceedings. More important, the basic subsistence approach places the burden of the
debtor's fresh start too heavily on the shoulders of the creditor
spouse. It is manifestly unjust to say that, as a matter of policy,
it is acceptable to reduce the creditor spouse's finances to the
level of mere subsistence for the sake of permitting her former
spouse to "start afresh free from the obligations and responsibilities"6 of his indebtedness.
Calhoun is a unique case insofar as it suggests that the
parties' financial circumstances at the time of the bankruptcy,
rather than only at the time of divorce, are relevant. Every
court of appeals that has addressed this "present needs" inquiry
has rejected it, finding changed circumstances to be irrelevant
and inconsistent with the requirements of § 523(a)(5).6 As the
Eleventh Circuit observed,
The language used by Congress in § 523(a)(5) requires bankruptcy courts
to determine nothing more than whether the support label accurately reflects that the obligation at issue is 'actually in the nature of alimony,
maintenance, or support. The statutory language suggests a simple inquiry as to whether the obligation can legitimately be characterized as
support, that is, whether it is in the nature of support. The language
does not suggest a precise inquiry into the financial circumstances to determine precise levels of need or support; nor does the statutory lan61. Id at 69.
62. Shaver v. Shaver, 736 F.2d 1314, 1316 (9th Cir. 1994).
63. Goin v. Goin (In re Goin), 808 F.2d 1391, 1393 (10th Cir. 1987); see also In re
Coffman, 52 B.R 667 (Bankr. D.C. Md. 1985) (standard of living one of many factors to
be considered).
64. Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 US. 234, 244 (1934).
65. Gianakas v. Gianakas (In re Gianakas), 917 F2d 759, 763 (3d Cir. 1990); Sylvester v. Sylvester, 865 F.2d 1164, 1166 (10th Cir. 1989); Forsdick v. Turgeon, 812 F.2d 801,
803 (2d Cir. 1987); Draper v. Draper, 790 F.2d 52, 54 (8th Cir. 1986); Harrell v. Sharp (In
re Harrell), 754 F.2d 902, 906 (11th Ci 1985).
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guage contemplate
an ongoing assessment of need as circumstances
68
change.

Once the bankruptcy courts engage in the assessment of the
present financial circumstances of both parties, they are, in essence, modifying support awards, which is the prerogative of
state domestic relations courts. Calhoun itself recognized as
much, but at the time the court mistakenly believed that the resulting intrusion on state court authority would be minimal.67
In Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald, the Sixth Circuit appears to
have limited its Calhoun opinion by suggesting that the "present needs" test applies only to obligations dealt with in Calhoun, hold harmless agreements. 68 The Fitzgerald court also
noted the criticisms made of the present needs test in the federal appellate decisions, particularly that the test "punishes the
nondebtor spouse who has struggled to become self-supporting
...

[T]he test would result in the discharge of an overwhelm-

ingly high number of support obligations because by the time a
debtor files for bankruptcy, most former spouses will have become self-reliant. 69
Gianakas correctly expresses the result that the creditor
spouse is punished for her attempted pursuit of the American
ideal of working hard to better one's financial situation and
achieving some degree of economic comfort. But this criticism
applies to the support analysis generally. On the whole,
§ 523(a)(5) analysis is a search for a "needy" creditor spouse. It
appears that the bankruptcy courts are attempting to arrive at
66. Harrell,754 F.2d at 906.
67. Long v. Calhoun (In re Calhoun), 715 F.2d 1103, 1109 n.10 (6th Cir. 1983). The
opinion appears to be more concerned with agreements negotiated between the parties

than with a distribution scheme actually created by the domestic relations court. I disagree with the court's proposition that such an agreement should be subject to a stricter

standard in bankruptcy because the parties themselves are the least likely to be aware
of the legal consequences that could follow. Moreover, as Professor Singer points out,
"courts and commentators today generally favor private resolution of financial issues as
a means of encouraging amicable dissolution, fostering certainty and finality, and promoting judicial economy." Singer I, supra note 6, at 86.
68. Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald (In re Fitzgerald), 9 F.3d 517, 520-21 (6th Cir. 1993).
Noting its regret that Calhoun had been applied more broadly than intended, the Fitzgerald court explained that the purpose of the present needs test was to apply to hold
harmless agreements "a minimum standard ordinarily applied by state courts," allowing
a debtor to discharge the debt to the extent it exceeds what the domestic relations court
would have ordered as support. Id. at 520-21. This clarification fails to explain the relevance of the parties' present financial circumstances, nor does it reduce the banlruptcy
courts' intrusion into state domestic relations court authority.
69. Id. at 520-21 (citing Gianakas v. Gianakas (In re Gianakas), 917 E2d 759, 763
(3d Cir. 1990)).
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equitable decisions, at least in those cases where the debtor appears to be seeking a fresh start from his former spouse rather
than from an unmanageable level of indebtedness. 70 The problem is that the focus of the courts' analysis rests too heavily on
neediness. The more sympathetic the plight of the creditor
spouse, the greater the chance of nondischargeability, and it appears that creditor spouses whose marriages typified the traditional nuclear family structure are most likely to prevail. Least
likely to be found in need of support are those creditor spouses,
for the most part women, who have availed themselves of the
increased opportunities for education and careers. In the eyes of
some courts, these spouses are likely to appear fully capable of
bearing the financial burden flowing from the bankruptcy of
their former husbands.
The irony increases: the creditor spouse is the only creditor
in bankruptcy who must establish a need for the money. Banks
and other financial institutions making nondischargeability
claims against a debtor are not required to show that they need
the money, nor will a profitable past defeat an otherwise successful argument. One could argue, of course, that the creditor
spouse ought to need the money that the debtor owes her. Any
standard other than need is arguably inconsistent with the
fresh start policy of bankruptcy, because the debtor's entitlement to his fresh start would be compromised at the expense of
a creditor spouse who has the means to support herself, no matter how restricted those means may be. A correlative argument
for the need standard is that § 523(aX5) is not designed to protect the creditor spouse at all; rather it protects society from an
increased welfare burden that may result if debtors could avoid
their familial responsibilities by filing for bankruptcy 7l But this
rationale ignores the plain reality that the costs of bankruptcy
generally are in fact borne by society. Institutional creditors insulate themselves from nonpayment of debts because they are
able to assess the risk of each potential debtor and spread the
70. See, eg., Bush v. Taylor, 893 F.2d 962 (8th Cir. 1990), supersd by, Bush v. Taylor, 912 F.2d 989 (8th Cir. 1990). Judge Bowman, author of the [en bancl decision, did
not mince words in his dissent from the court of appeals decision, which had allowed the
debtor to discharge his obligation to pay his former spouse one-half of his military pension. Calling that decision "indefensible," Judge Bowman stated that it 'permits a deadbeat husband to use the Bankruptcy Code's grace for honest debtors as a slick scheme
for euchring his former wife out of her 'sole and separate property'. . . Short of outright
thievery, it is hard to imagine a more compelling case of unjust enrichment.! Id. at 967.
71. Shaver v. Shaver, 736 F.2d 1314, 1316 n.3 (9th Cir. 1984) (citing Madison Grove,
Comment, Putative Spousal Support Rights and the Federal Bankruptcy Act, 25 UCLA
L REv. 96, 96-97 n.7 (1977)).

390

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45

risk of loss among many debtors. In short, they understand that
not all of the money they lend will be repaid, and they prepare
for the possibility in a way that allows them to remain profitable. Creditor spouses simply do not have this capability, even
when they have college degrees and some measure of economic
independence. In the context of a post-divorce bankruptcy, it is
neither financial institutions nor society that risks paying for
the debtor's fresh start--it is the creditor spouse.
Il.

SECTION 523(A)(15):

OTHERWISE DISCHARGEABLE DOMESTIC OBLIGATIONS

Section 523(a)(15), "newly enacted and untamed,"72 creates a
second exception for debts arising from a divorce decree. Applicable to otherwise dischargeable property settlements and hold
harmless agreements, 73 § 523(a)(15) allows these obligations to
be discharged only if the debtor is unable to pay them or if the
benefit of discharge to the debtor outweighs the detrimental consequences to the creditor spouse from their nonpayment. 74 Section 523(a)(15) is theoretically advantageous because it was intended to expand the code's protection of the creditor spouse in
the bankruptcy proceeding. Its purpose was to resolve the harsh
effect of the § 523(a)(5) dichotomy, allowing even nonsupport obligations to survive bankruptcy. But its protection is not so farreaching or all-encompassing. The protective nature of
§ 523(a)(15) is limited in many important respects. In terms of
procedural issues, interpretation, and application, § 523(a)(15) is
a remarkably troublesome provision.
A.

The Legislative History

The legislative history states that § 523(a)(15) was designed
to protect the creditor spouse who accepted lowered alimony or
child support payments in exchange for either a larger property
settlement or the debtor's agreement to assume their joint obligations.75 This stated intent, however, narrows the overall pro72. Kessler v. Butler (In re Butler), 186 B.R 371, 372 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1995).
73. In this context, otherwise dischargeable means that, under § 523(aX5) analysis,
the obligation is not in the nature of support.

74. See H.R. REP. No. 103-835, at 53 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.N. 3362.
75. HR. REp. No. 103-835, at 54 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.N. 3363. "If
such 'hold harmless' and property settlement obligations are not found to be in the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support, they are dischargeable under current law. The

nondebtor spouse may be saddled with substantial debt and little or no alimony or supportf Id.
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tection for the creditor spouse. Because the exchange involves
foregone child support or alimony to which the creditor spouse is
entitled, the larger property settlement or hold harmless agreement is the very essence of support. In this respect, § 523(a)(15)
actually dilutes the protection of the creditor spouse. A creditor
spouse who bargains away alimony or child support to which
she is otherwise entitled has merely agreed to a different form
of support payment; the substance is unchanged.
Even more confusing is the legislative statement regarding
the two tests within § 523(a)(15), the inability to pay and the
benefit/detriment analysis.76 The legislative history, in attempting to explain these two tests, states that the section applies
in cases where the debtor has the ability to pay [the debts] and the detriment to the nondebtor spouse from their nonpayment outweighs the benefit to the debtor of discharging such debts. In other words, the debt will
remain dischargeable if paying the debt would reduce the debtor's income below that necessary for the support of the debtor and the debtor's
dependents. The Committee believes that payment of support needs must
take precedence over property settlement debts. The debt will also be
discharged if the benefit to the debtor of discharging it outweighs the
harm to the obligee. For example, if a nondebtor spouse would suffer little detriment from the debtor's nonpayment of an obligation required to
be paid under a hold harmless agreement (perhaps because it could not
be collected from the nondebtor spouse or because the nondebtor spouse
could easily pay it) the obligation would be discharged. The benefits of
the debtor's discharge should be sacrificed only if there would be substantial detriment to the nondebtor spouse that outweighs the debtor's
need for a fresh start. 7

From this statement, it appears that the right hand of Congress knows not what its left hand is doing. Regarding the
debtor's ability to pay, there is some guidance: in determining
whether the debts are dischargeable, the debtor's need to support himself and his dependents is more important than payment of domestic obligations. But the guiding hand of Congress
became less certain with respect to the benefitdetriment analysis because Congress concurrently contemplates both minimal
and substantial detriment to the creditor spouse as the standard. On the one hand, it refers to a creditor spouse who will
suffer "little detriment" from discharge; on the other, Congress
seems to require that the detriment to the creditor spouse be

"substantial."
76. For a discussion of the debtor's inability to pay, see infra Part HLC. For a discussion of the benefit/detriment analysis, see infra Part ILD.
77. HR REP.
No. 103-835, at 54 (1994), reprinted in 1994 US.C.CA.N. 3363.
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In order to read § 523(a)(15) as having a purpose that expands, or at least does not diminish, the protection afforded the
creditor spouse (as was undoubtedly the legislative intent)
§ 523(a)(15) must be read as follows: property settlements and
hold harmless agreements that are in the nature of support, as
where alimony or child support are reduced in exchange for the
assumption of debt or for a larger property settlement, are nondischargeable under § 523(a)(5) and thus not subject to the balancing test of § 523(a)(15). The dischargeability of the remaining provisions of the decree are then examined under the
inability to pay and the benefit/detriment tests of § 523(a)(15)(A)
and (B). This interpretation comports with the plain language of
§ 523(a)(15). Moreover, this interpretation makes both sections
meaningful and allows them to be read and applied together,
which the language of § 523(a)(15) requires the courts to do.
B. ProceduralQuagmires
The problems inherent in the structure and application of
§ 523(a)(15) are numerous and arise at the very commencement
of the bankruptcy case. The first problem concerns the chapter
of bankruptcy under which the debtor has filed. If the debtor
has filed a petition for relief under Chapter 13, § 523(a)(15) does
not apply.78 In an effort to encourage debtors to seek relief under
Chapter 13, Congress narrowed the scope of applicable exceptions.79 Although this more expansive discharge might be theoretically defensible, it is unreasonable to exclude nonsupport obligations owed to a former spouse from this narrow scope
because the exclusion makes little sense. Congress has basically
determined that, when the conditions imposed by § 523(a)(15)
are met, a Chapter 7 debtor may not discharge his domestic obligations at all, but he may reduce them by 90 percent or more
if he seeks relief under the provisions of Chapter 13.80
Another immediate problem is the technical requirement
that, to argue nondischargeability under § 523(a)(15), the credi78. 11 US.C. § 1328(aX2) (1994).
79. Chapter 13 allows debtors to reorganize their debts. In theory, unsecured creditors are likely to receive a greater payout than under the liquidation provisions of Chapter 7.
80. Section 523(aX15) does apply to Chapter 11 bankruptcy cases, which also involve reorganization of debt. However, individual Chapter 11 petitions are fairly rare,
because most individual debtors who prefer to reorganize rather than liquidate will fit
within the debt ceiling imposed as an eligibility requirement for Chapter 13 relief 11
U.S.C. § 109(e) (1994).
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tor spouse must initiate an adversary proceeding"1 in the bankruptcy court within 60 days from the date of the first scheduled
meeting of creditors held pursuant to § 341,82 or the argument is
forever lost.83 This timing issue raises at least three important
problems for the creditor spouse.
The first problem concerns the extent to which the creditor
spouse will be able to show the "detrimental consequences" that
will befall her if the debts are discharged. For example, to what
extent may a creditor spouse establish harm from the debtor's
promise to assume joint debt when the third party to whom the
debt is owed has not yet commenced collection activities against
the creditor spouse? At least one court has found that the absence of collection activity, rather than the potential exposure,
militated against the creditor spouse.84
The second problem with the limited time allowed for filing
a § 523(a)(15) action is one of practical consideration for the
creditor spouse. Section 523(a)(15) must be read in conjunction
with § 523(aX5) in order to properly characterize the nature of
the obligations in the decree.8 5 Because § 523(a)(15) excepts
81. FED. R BANKE P. 7001.
82. 11 US.C. § 341 (1994).
83. FED. R. BANm. P. 4007(c) (1994). This rule provides, in relevant part, that:
[A] complaint to determine the dischargeability of any debt pursuant to
§ 523(c) of the Code shall be filed not later than 60 days following the first
date set for the meeting of creditors held pursuant to § 341(a). The court shall
give all creditors not less than [thirty] days notice of the time so fixed in the
manner provided in Rule 2002. On motion of any party in interest, after hearing on notice, the court may for cause extend the time fixed under this subdivision. The motion shall be made before the time has expired.
The reference in Rule 4007(c) to § 523(c) means that only certain exceptions are subject
to the time limitations in the Rule. Those exceptions are §§ 523(aX2), (4), (6), and (15).
Section 623(cX1) further provides that:
the debtor shall be discharged from a debt or a kind specified in paragraph (2),
(4), (6), or (15) of subsection (a) of this section, unless, on request of the creditor to whom such debt is owed, and after notice and a hearing, the court determines such debt to be excepted from discharge.
11 U.S.C. § 523(cX1) (1994).
84. Wiley v. Willey (In re Wiley), 198 BI. 1007, 1016 (Bankr S.D. Fla. 1996). Notably, this same court found as a benefit to the debtor of discharge the fact that he need
not worry about his former wife dragging him into court for the rest of his life seeking
payment of the debts. Id. at 1016. It seems somewhat inequitable that the dark cloud of
possible legal action in the future may be dismissed as inconsequential to the creditor
spouse while allowing that the dissipation of that same dark cloud for the debtor is, in
fact, a factor to be considered.
85. Carroll v. Carroll (In re Carroll), 187 B.R. 197, 199 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1995)
('The language of § 523(aX15) implies that the Court initially decide whether the debt
falls within the exception to discharge set forth in § 523(aX5).).
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debts "not of the kind described" in § 523(a)(5), the creditor
spouse may be forced to have the bankruptcy court first determine whether the debts in question are actually in the nature of
support, causing her to bring all of her arguments within the
limited time period and excluding her from the jurisdiction of
the state court.8 6 Where the debtor has filed for bankruptcy
within a very short time following the divorce, which is not uncommon, 7 the creditor spouse might find herself without the fi86. See Brigner, supra note 5, at 23 (grant to the bankruptcy courts of exclusive jurisdiction over § 523(aX15) "will probably see the end of dischargeability litigation in
state courts').
87. Just by way of illustration, the following represents a number of the cases I
have read in researching § 523(aX15) for this article. In the many cases I read in preparation of the article, two patterns emerged. First, in most of the cases involving
§ 523(aX15) decisions, the time period between the divorce, or an order to enforce a provision of a decree, and the filing of the debtor's bankruptcy petition is one year or less.
Second, in nearly all of them it was the former husband who sought to discharge the domestic obligations. (I have indicated those in which the former wife sought bankruptcy
relief, infra). This is by no means intended as a representative sample; it is illustrative.
I can say with certainty that there is a serious need for empirical research on the issue
of bankruptcy and divorce as a whole. For the ground breaking work in this area, see
generally, THERESA A- SuLuvAN ET AL, As WE FoRGwVE OuR DEBTORS: BANKRUPTCY AND
CONSUMER CR rr
iN AmrnICA (1989).
Campbell v. Campbell (In re Campbell), 198 B.R. 467 (Bankr. D. S.C. 1996) (approximately one month) Parnes v. Parnes (In re Parnes), 200 B.R. 710 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1996)
(one month); Collins v. Hesson (In re Hesson), 190 B.R. 229 (Bankr. D. Md. 1995) (petition filed one month after obligations under decree became due; debtor was former wife);
Gamble v. Gamble (In re Gamble), 196 B.R. 54 (Bankr. ND. Tex. 1996) (one month after
creditor spouse obtained judgment in state court on obligations owed pursuant to decree); Straub v. Straub (In re Straub), 192 B.R. 522 (Bankr D. N.D. 1996) (one month);
Sterna v. Paneras (In re Paners), 195 B.R. 395 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1996) (two months);
King v. Speaks (In re Speaks), 193 BR. 436 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1995) (two months after
state court order to comply); In re Tremaine, 188 B.R. 380 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1995) (two
months); Bodily v. Morris (In re Morris), 193 B.R. 949 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1996) (two
months); Martin v. Morello (In re Morello), 185 B.R. 753 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1995) (three
months); Whaley v. Whaley (In re Whaley), 190 BR. 818 (Bankr. N.D. Miss. 1995) (three
months after entry of order delineating property distribution); Travis v. Douglas (In re
Douglas), 202 BR.I 961 (Banks S.D. Ill. 1996) (four months);, Greenwalt v. Greenwalt (In
re Greenwalt), 200 B.R. 909 (Bankr. W). Wash. 1996) (four months); Craig v. Craig (In
re Craig), 196 B.R. 305 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1996) (four months); McGinnis v. McGinnis (In
re McGinnis), 194 B.R. 917 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1996) (five months, debtor was former
wife); Jenkins v. Jenkins (In re Jenkins), 202 B.R. 102 (Bankr. C.D. m 1996) (five
months); Soforenko v. Soforenko (In re Soforenko), 203 BR. 853 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1997)
(six months); Belcher v. Owens (In re Owens), 191 B.R. 669 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. 1996) (six
months); Henderson v. Henderson (In re Henderson), 200 B.R. 322 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio
1996) (seven months); Reeder v. Ziegler (In re Ziegler), No. 94-61854, 1995 WL 512197
(Bankr. NJD. Ohio Aug. 9, 1995) (seven months); Stegall v. Stegall (In re Stegall), 188
B.R. 597 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1995) (ten months); Hill v. Hill (In re Hill), 184 B.R. 750
(Bankr. N.D. I. 1995) (11 months); Woodworth v. Woodworth (In re Woodworth), 187
BR. 174 (NJ). Ohio 1995) (petition date not available but trial on § 523(aX15) complaint

1997]

IRRECONCILABLE DIFFERENCES

395

nancial resources necessary to litigate both issues fully s Moreover, the creditor spouse would naturally prefer a finding that
the debts are actually in the nature of support because they are
then nondischargeable without any rebalancing of the financial
condition of the spouses. Moreover, obligations for support are
preferred over property settlements elsewhere in the Code, including a priority status for payment,89 restrictions on the
debtor's ability to avoid judicial liens, 9° and the ability to keep
payments that could otherwise be avoided as preferential. 91 The
problem is that issues of support are more properly handled in
the state courts, which have concurrent jurisdiction with the
bankruptcy courts on § 523(a)(5) issues.9 2 Forcing this issue in
the bankruptcy court not only denies the creditor spouse the
state forum that bankruptcy judges readily admit is most appropriate for handling matters of support and property divisions; 93
conducted ten months after divorce); Slover (McMurrough) v. Slover (In re Slover), 191
B.R. 886 (Bankn E.D. Okla. 1996) (same); Adie v. Adie (In re Mdie), 197 B.R. 8 (Bankn D.
NL 1996) (petition filed 'at or about the time' the obligations became due).
88. Judge Brigner expresses his distaste for the procedural requirements of
§ 523(aX15) as follows:
The practical result is to demand that the (by definition) financiallydisadvantaged spouse in a (by definition) financially burdened relationship,
during a (by definition) financially expensive and emotionally distressful time,
must instantly recognize the need and organize the resources to hire experienced bankruptcy counsel, in order to protect a property division which state
law has already ordered and which federal law has already declared nondischargeable; the penalty being merely the loss by the already financially disadvantaged spouse of everything accumulated during the marriage. It would be
extremely surprising if more than a small percentage of nondebtor spouses succeed in shooting through this procedural window to protect their marital property divisions.
Brigner, supra note 5, at 22.
89. 11 U.S.C. § 507(aX7) (1994).
90. I& § 522(fX1XA).
91. 1 § 547(cX7).
92. In re Crawford, 183 B.R. 103, 107 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1995) ('it is now clear that
bankruptcy courts and state courts have concurrent jurisdiction to determine whether a
debt is excepted from discharge under § 523(aX5)") (quoting Rosenbaum v. Cummings
(In re Rosenbaum), 150 B.R. 994, 996 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1993)).
93. See Schmitt v. Eubanks (In re Schmitt), 197 B. 312 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1996).
In Schmitt, Judge Scott clearly expressed the thoughts of many bankruptcy judges regarding their belief that these matters are best left to the state domestic relations courts
in her discussion of § 523(aX15)(B), the benefit/detriment analysis, an issue that:
Congress foolishly placed exclusively before the federal courts rather than state
domestic and family courts which are clearly the courts with the expertise to
assess need of the former spouses and their families. Those state courts should
have concurrent jurisdiction to make determinations under section 523(aX15),
as they have jurisdiction to determine section 523(aX5) obligations.
Id. at 317.
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it also will cause the bankruptcy courts to handle these domestic matters in even greater numbers. Furthermore, the indirect
requirement that § 523(a)(5) arguments be raised within the
limited time frame mandated for § 523(a)(15) is not entirely consistent with the Bankruptcy Rules, which specifically provide
that §523(a)(5) actions may be brought at any time."
A third problem, related to the second, is the unaddressed
question of what happens to the creditor spouse's legal ability to
argue nondischargeability under § 523(a)(5) at a later time if
she raises only the § 523(aX15) argument during the bankruptcy
proceeding. Section 523(a)(15), both by its language and judicial
interpretation, requires the creditor spouse to show that the obligations in question are not in the nature of support, unless, of

course, that argument has already been unsuccessfully raised in
the bankruptcy proceeding. Having conceded this point, the
creditor spouse may find herself barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel from later arguing that the obligation was, in fact,
in the nature of support.95
94. FED. R. BAmxa P. 4007(b) provides that "A complaint other than under 523(c)
may be filed at any time? FED. K. BANK& P. 4007(c) restricts the time period in which a
complaint to determine the dischargeability of debt pursuant to §§ 523(aX2), (4), (6), and
(15) must be filed to no more than 60 days after the first scheduled meeting of creditors.
Id. at Advisory Committee Note&
In In re Crawford, 183 B.R. at 106, the court stated that "there is no time limit for
filing a complaint by either debtor or creditor to determine dischargeability under
§ 523(aX5). The issue... is never finalized unless some party litigates the issue in a
court of competent jurisdiction! That the creditor spouse is not time barred from seeking a determination of nondischergeability is particularly important when the only affected provisions of the decree are the debtor's promise to hold her harmless on joint obligations. The third party creditor to whom she is liable can sue her until the relevant
state statute of limitations has run. Thus, under § 523(aX5), a period of years could potentially elapse before a dischargeability determination is made.
It thus appears that the following scenarios apply. The creditor spouse who takes no
timely action in the debtor's bankruptcy proceeding whatsoever is forever barred from
asserting a claim under § 523(aX15). However, she is not barred from filing a complaint
at a later time to determine dischargeability under § 523(aX5).
95. It may be possible for the creditor spouse to draft her complaint in a way that
protects her ability to later raise an argument under § 523(a)(5). She might, for example, stipulate only for the purpose of the § 523(aX15) proceeding that the obligations are
not of the kind described in § 523(aX5). Whether such an attempt would be successful is
unknown at this point, as I have found no cases discussing the issue. Moreover, it is an
unsettled point whether a judgment based on a stipulation should be precluded because
that issue has not actually been litigated and decided by a court. As one treatise
explains:
In order to apply collateral estoppel in these situations, it is logically necessary, then, that some substitute for litigation and judicial determination be accepted. As a general proposition the only acceptable substitute is the parties'
intention; and this intention must be more than the intention to conclude the
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On a broader level, the new § 523(a)(15) makes things
worse for the creditor spouse, not better. Even though courts
had trouble applying § 523(a)(5) before § 523(a)(15) was enacted,
at least the well-meaning courts could bend over backwards to
reclassify property settlements as support, in order to make
§ 523(a)(5) more palatable.96 Under § 523(a)(5), the courts established certain principles that provided at least some measure of
protection for the creditor spouse.97 But the language and legislative history of § 523(a)(15) make it virtually impossible for
courts to liberally construe § 523(a)(5) because the new exception strengthens the misguided notion that portions of a divorce
decree, i.e., the property settlement provisions, are the perks of
divorce that must, and easily can, give way to the debtor's entitlement to a "fresh start." Section 523(a)(15) maintains the requirement that support obligations somehow be distinguished
from "mere" property settlements, and because state domestic
relations courts have no jurisdiction over § 523(a)(15), the bankruptcy courts must make this distinction in a far greater number of cases. Bankruptcy judges readily admit their dislike of
§ 523(a)(15), both because it is so difficult to interpret and apply, and because it makes the bankruptcy court a readily availaissue for purposes of the suit which ends in a default judgment, consent judgment, or judgment on stipulation. Normally there must, in addition to the intent to conclude issues for the case at bar, be such an intent to conclude the issue or issues for other situations.
1B JAmEs Wb. Moons, ET AL, MoonREs FEDERAL PRACTICE 1 0.444[1] (2d ed. 1996). However, the author's principal concern was that parties could be precluded from litigating
issues in the future that were unforeseen at the time of their present litigation. This is
not the case for the creditor spouse in bankruptcy because the language of § 523(a)(15)
is clearly linked to that of § 523(aX5).
96. See Jones v. Jones (In re Jones) 9 F.3d 878, 881 (10th Cir. 1993) (holding that
the term support is entitled to a broad application); Miller v. Gerald (In re Miller) 55
F.3d 1487, 1489 (10th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, Miller v. Gentry, 166 S. Ct. 305 (1995)
(policy of § 523(aX5) "favors enforcement of familial obligations over a "fresh start" for
the debtor").
97. The courts were in general agreement that the substance of the decree will govern its form and that a hold harmless agreement can constitute nondisthargeable support. See supra Part IL Section 523(aX15) also seems to incorporate the much-maligned
"present needs" test adopted by the Sixth Circuit in Long v. Calhoun (In re Calhoun),
715 F2d 1103, 1109 (6th Cir. 1983). Every federal court of appeals that considered the
present needs test rejected it. See Gianakas v. Gianakas (In re Gianakas), 917 E2d 759,
763 (3d Cir. 1990); Sylvester v. Sylvester, 865 F.2d 1164, 1166 (10th Cir. 1989); Forsdick
v. Turgeon, 812 F2d 801, 803 (2d Cir. 1987); Draper v. Draper, 790 F.2d 52, 54 (8th Cir.
1986); Harrell v. Sharp, 754 F2d 902, 906 (11th Cir. 1985). Nevertheless, the language of
§ 523(aX15) quite clearly operates in the present, and courts interpreting that language
have uniformly held that the financial circumstances of the parties at the time of the divorce is irrelevant.
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ble forum for reliving the pain and emotional hostility of a divorce. 98 More important, bankruptcy judges understand that
they are not the appropriate arbiters of post-marital disputes.
Congress, apparently oblivious to reality, preserved all that was
wrong with the Code's treatment of the creditor spouse, and diminished what little was right.
Section 523(a)(15) does little more than § 523(a)(5) was already doing, with the exception that it provides the debtor with
a defense,'* posing the risk that a debt that was nondischargeable support under the former regime may now be discharged.
Such a result renders meaningless the intent of Congress in protecting the creditor spouse-an unwilling creditor with little
other protection-from the harm flowing from the debtor's
bankruptcy.
C. Burden of Proof
It is unclear which party must prove the various elements
of § 523(aX15), and courts have run the gamut of interpretation
in this respect. The most precise judicial statement rendered
thus far is that the issue "is clearly in need of legislative
remediation or clarification." 100 The problem of allocating the
burden of proof arises in part because there are three distinct
elements to § 523(aX15): that the debt is not actually in the nature of support, that the debtor is unable to pay the debts, and
that discharge produces a benefit to the debtor that outweighs
the detrimental consequences to the creditor spouse. As to the
first element, courts agree that the creditor spouse must prove
that the debts fit within the scope of § 523(a)(15). 101 In contrast,
98. See Kessler v. Butler (In re Butler), 186 B.R. 371, 372 (Bankn D. Vt. 1995). But/er is most illustrative:
Section [523](aX15) is a pernicious creature. Using it is equivalent to applying
acupuncture without a license because it does not heal the emotional wounds
from a divorce. Indeed, section (aX15) is an intrusive invasion into the private
lives of a former couple who had agreed in their divorce to separate forever.
Section (aX15) can be described as an impediment to the emotional fresh start
in life that divorce may bring.
Id.
99. See In re Minnick, 198 B.R. 187, 188 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1996).
100. Taylor v. Taylor (In re Taylor), 191 B.R. 760, 764 (N.D. MII.1996), affd Taylor v.
Taylor, 199 BI. 37 (NJD. Il. 1996); ef Collins v. Hesson (In re Hesson), 190 B.R. 229,
238 ('This is not a critical issue. Rarely is evidence in equipoise.").
10L Florio v. Florio (In re Florio), 187 B.R. 654, 657 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1995) (creditor spouse must show debt "not of the kind described in subsection (a)(5)"); Gantz v.
Gantz (In re Gantz) 192 BR. 932, 935 (Bankr. N.D. EL 1996) ("Courts do not dispute
that the initial burden is on the creditor.").
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there is little agreement with respect to the latter two elements.
The party seeking nondischargeability generally must prove
by a preponderance of the evidence that an exception to discharge under § 523(a) applies. 10 2 Some courts, interpreting
§ 523(aX15) consistently with this general rule, place the burden
entirely on the creditor spouse. 103 In In re Woodworth, for example, the court summarily concluded that the creditor spouse
bears the burden of proving nondischargeability by a preponderance of the evidence. 104 Similarly, the court in In re Butler held
that nothing in the language of § 523(aX15) supported the conclusion that it ought to be treated differently from the § 523(a)
exceptions generally.1°6
Section 523(a)(15) is, however, textually different from most
of the exceptions to discharge. Recognizing that the language of
§ 523(a)(15) does not neatly comport with the requirement that
the creditor bear the full burden of proof, some courts have
adopted an approach that involves a shifting of the burden at
various stages. As explained by the court in In re Hesson,
Plaintiff must file a timely adversary proceeding and prove a cause of action based upon a debt incurred by a debtor in the course of a divorce or
separation or in connection with a separation agreement, divorce decree
Although not generally disputed, theoretically this is a rather odd conclusion when
one considers that in the § 523(aX5) proceeding the creditor spouse bears the burden of
proving the debts are actually in the nature of support.
102. Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 287 (1991). Courts placing the burden of proof
on the creditor spouse rely on dicta of the Grogan Court's
conviction that Congress intended the preponderance standard to apply to the
discharge exceptions is reinforced by the structure of § 523(a), which groups together in the same subsection a variety of exceptions without any indication
that any particular exception is subject to a special standard of proofE The
omission of any suggestion that different exemptions have different burdens of
proof implies that the legislators intended the same standard to govern the
nondischargeability under 523(a)(2) claims and, for example, the nondischargeability under § 523(aX5) of claim for child support and alimony.
Further support for this burden allocation is in FFD. K BANKR. P. 4005, which states:
"Atthe trial on a complaint objecting to a discharge, the plaintiff has the burden of proving the objection?
103. Butler, 186 BR at 374-75 (discussing reasons why the burden in § 523(aX15)
cases should be treated no differently than for exceptions generally); Carter v. Carter (In
re Carter), 189 B.R 521 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1995) (assumes without discussion that creditor spouse bears burden); Greenwalt v. Greenwalt (In re Greenwalt), 200 BRL 909, 913
(Bankr. W.D. Wash. 1996); Dressler v. Dressler (In re Dressler), 194 B.R. 290, 302
(Bankr. D. R.L 1996) (court unconvinced that burden shifting doctrines are required by
§ 523(aX15) or necessary to carry out its purpose).
104. Woodworth v. Woodworth (In re Woodworth), 187 B.R 174, 177 (Bankr. NM).
Ohio 1995).
105. Butler, 186 B.R at 374.
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or other qualifying order. Once Plaintiff has overcome this obstacle, this
court finds that the burden of going forward and the burden of proof is
bifurcated. If the debtor can show the inability to pay the § 523(aX15)
debt then the examination stops. There is no motivation for plaintiff to
meet that burden. However, if the debtor can afford to make the payment, then the plaintiff has the burden, as is the norm in dischargeability actions, to show that the detrimental consequences outweigh the benefit to the debtor. This bifurcation results in placing the
burden upon the party more able to present evidence. Thus the debtor
must plead the affirmative defense of § 523(aX15XA) or waive it. In that
event, the court goes immediately to the issues of § 523(aX15XB) where
plaintiff has the burden of proof"10

This bifurcated approach seems to represent the discomfort
that some courts have in construing an exception to discharge
against the debtor. The Code itself requires a presumption in
favor of granting the discharge,107 and any exception to discharge obviously impairs the debtor's fresh start. Notwithstanding this general rule, there are in fact instances in which the
debtor must show that he is deserving of discharge of particular
debts 08 Even before the enactment of § 523(a)(15), the Code
provided two exceptions to discharge in which the burden shifts
to the debtor. One is § 523(aX2)(C), which presumes that certain
debts for "luxury goods or services" are nondischargeable if incurred within 60 days before the debtor filed his petition for
bankruptcy.109 The other is § 523(aX8), the exception for student
loan debts, which provides that student loans are nondischargeable unless the debtor proves that excepting those debts from
discharge will present an undue hardship for the debtor.110 That
106. Collins v. Hesson (In re Hesson), 190 B. 229, 238-39 (Ban7r. D. Md. 1995).
107. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b) (1994).
108. Hill v. Hill (In re Hill), 184 BR. 750, 754 (Bankr. N.D. 1L. 1995).
109. 11 U.S.C. § 523(aX2XCX1994). Because of its connection with "luxury goods or
services" there is virtually nothing in § 523(aX2XC) that supports its application in the
context of a divorce decree, and it has not been discussed in the marital context. However, I think it is worth pointing out that most divorce decrees involve financial obligations far in excess of the presumptive amount required in § 523(aX2XC). Congress obviously intended that debtors be forbidden from indulging in extravagant living on the eve
of bankruptcy because such behavior falls short of the 'honest but unfortunate" ideal. As
discussed in Part IV of this article, neither the courts nor Congress seem willing to recogniza that a bankruptcy filed on the heels of a divorce involves virtually identical
conduct.
110. 11 U.S.C. § 523(aX8) (1994) provides an exception to discharge:
for an educational benefit overpayment or loan made, insured or guaranteed by
a governmental unit, or made under any program funded in whole or in part
by a governmental unit or nonprofit institution, or for an obligation to repay
funds received as an educational benefit, scholarship or stipend, unless (A) such loan, benefit, scholarship, or stipend overpayment first became due
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§ 523(a)(8) shifts the burden of proof to the debtor without the
obvious language of a presumption as is found in § 523(a)(2)(C)
demonstrates that the structure and logic of an exception controls the issue of who must prove what. In this respect,
§ 523(a)(15) is quite similar to its student loan counterpart.
Each provides that the relevant debts will be excepted from discharge "unless" the debtor proves that he is entitled to a discharge of those debts."'
Even setting aside these similarities, the plain language of
§ 523(aX15) supports the conclusion that the debtor must prove
that he is entitled to discharge. Section 523(a)(15)(A) is in the
negative; it requires a showing that the debtor is unable to pay.
As those courts applying a bifurcated standard have recognized,
it would be anomalous to require the creditor spouse to prove
that the debtor is unable to pay the obligations. 11 Section
523(a)(15)(B)'s language is similar. It requires a showing that
the benefit to the debtor outweighs the detrimental consequences to the creditor spouse, not that the creditor spouse's
detriment outweighs the benefit of discharge to the debtor. The
plain language indicates that the debtor must show that, on balance, the scale actually tips in his favor. In essence, the statutory language creates a rebuttable presumption that the debts
are nondischargeable but gives the debtor two chances to overcome this presumption.1 1
The confusion over the proper allocation of the burden of
proof lies less in the language of the statute than in reconciling
§ 523(a)(15) with the general allocation of burdens in §523(a)
and a legislative history that is on the whole difficult to undermore than 7 years (exclusive of any applicable suspension of the repayment perod) before the date of the filing of the petition; or
(B) excepting such debt from discharge under this paragraph will impose an
undue hardship on the debtor or the debtor's dependents.
111. But see Kessler v. Butler (in re Butler), 186 B.RI 371, 374 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1995).
That court distinguished § 523(aX15) from the student loan exception because in paragraph (B) of the latter, the "unless" is followed by "discharging such debtP while the former reads "unless excepting such debt.7 In other words, § 523(a)(15)(B) demonstrates
that Congress intended that the debtor receive his discharge unless the creditor spouse
proves that the exception applies. This, of course, leaves § 523(aX15)(A) completely out

of the analysis. Moreover, it elevates a single word above the contextual whole of the
exception.

112. Collins v. Hesson (In re Hesson), 190 B.R. 229, 239 (Bankr. D. Md. 1995); Carroll v. Carroll (In re Carroll), 187 B.RI

197, 200 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1995).

113. Samayoa v. Jodoin (In re Jodoin), 196 B.R. 845, 853 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1996);
Schmitt v. Schmitt (In re Schmitt), 197 B.& 312, 315 (Bankr.W.D. Ark. 1996); Cleveland
v. Cleveland (In re Cleveland), 198 BR. 394, 397 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1996); Humiston v.

Huddleston (In re Huddleston), 194 B.I 681, 685 (Bankr N.D. Ga. 1996).
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stand. Had Congress selected more precise language, as it did
with the presumption provided in § 523(a)(2)(C), the confusion
would not have arisen. Still, even without a clearly stated presumption, it is well-settled that under the student loan exception the debtor must prove he is entitled to a discharge. The two
exceptions in which the debtor bears the burden do indeed stand
in contrast to the general scheme, but both the language and
subsequent judicial interpretation make clear that Congress intended that shift. The language of § 523(a)(15) is equally clear.
Similarly, no examination of the legislative history need be undertaken if one simply pays close attention to the language of
the statute: a nonsupport obligation arising from a divorce decree is excepted from discharge unless 1) the debtor does not
have the ability to pay, or 2) discharging the debt produces a
benefit to the debtor that outweighs the detrimental consequences to the creditor spouse. Attempts to reconcile
§ 523(a)(15) with the remainder of the exception scheme or the
legislative history are not only unnecessary; they are
11 4
inappropriate.
D. The Debtor's Inability to Pay: § 523(a)(15)(A)
The debtor may discharge those domestic obligations not actually in the nature of support if he is unable to pay them from
his income or property that is not reasonably necessary for his
own support or for the support of his dependents. 1 5 In determining whether the debtor is unable to pay, many courts
have
looked to § 1325(b)(2)," 6 which, using similar language, defines
disposable income as income received by the debtor that is not
reasonably necessary for the debtor's maintenance or support." 7
114. United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 242 (1989) ("The
plain meaning of legislation should be conclusive, except in the 'rare cases [in which] the

literal application of a statute will produce a result demonstrably at odds with the intentions of its drafters!"). Justice Scalia has often admonished the lower federal courts for
ignoring the plain language of a statute. See, ag., Patterson v. Shumate, 504 US. 753,
766 (1992) (concurring opinion) (asking 'whether our legal culture has so far departed
from attention to text, or is so lacking in agreed-upon methodology for creating and interpreting text, that it any longer makes sense to talk of 'a government of laws, not of
men! ).

115. 11 US.C. § 523(aX15XA).
116. Hill v. Hill (In re Hill), 184 B.R. 750, 755 (Bankr.N.D. IM. 1995); Phillips v.
Phillips (In re Phillips), 187 BR. 363, 369 (Bankr.M.D. Fla. 1995), Taylor v. Taylor (In re
Taylor), 191 BR. 760, 765 (Bankr.N.D. 11L 1996).
117. 11 US.C. § 1325(bX2) (1994) provides:
(2) For purposes of this subsection, "disposable income" means income which is
received by the debtor and which is not reasonably necessary to be expended:
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Because the language in § 523(a)(15)(A) is similar to that of
§ 1325(b)(2), it seems sensible to incorporate an existing body of
law rather than reinvent the wheel. Nonetheless, there are differences between § 1325(b)(2) and § 523(a)(15)(A) that give rise
to serious unresolved issues of interpretation. One difference is
obvious from the language: § 1325(b)(2) refers to the debtor's
"income," whereas § 523(a)(15)(A) requires examination of the
debtor's income and property. It is obviously improper to write a
word completely out of a statute,19 and yet wholesale application of the disposable income test to § 523(a)(15)(A) has the potential to do just that.119
The puzzling question is the property to which
§ 523(a)(15)(A) refers. Upon filing his bankruptcy petition, the
debtor's property becomes property of the estate to the extent
that it is not exempt.'" Although certain property is retained by
the debtor,2 1 that property which goes to the estate no longer
belongs to him and may not be considered in examining the
debtor's ability to pay. The problem this creates was well demonstrated in In re Phillips,"m in which the creditor spouse argued
that the debtor had the ability to pay his domestic obligations
because the value of his stocks, which he understated in his
bankruptcy schedules, exceeded the totality of his debts. The
court rejected this argument because irrespective of the value of
that stock, it was property of the estate and irrelevant to the
debtor's ability to pay, which "must be based solely on the
amount of his disposable income.1 3
The case law provides little guidance in this respect. In In
re Woodworth, the court stated that property "necessarily means
exempt property and postpetition income"'' 24 under
(A) for the maintenance or support of the debtor or a dependent of the debtor;
and
(B) if the debtor is engaged in business, for the payment of expenditures necessary for the continuation, preservation, and operation of such business.
118. Morales v. Trans World Airlines, 504 U.S. 374, 386 (1992).
119. There are cases in which the debtor's inability to pay was determined with no
reference whatsoever to any property of the debtor. See, eg., Hill, 184 B.I at 755 (determining debtor unable to pay based solely on monthly expenses that exceeded debtor's income); Carter v. Carter (In re Carter), 189 B.R. 521, 522 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1995) (statutory language restricts the determination "solely to the income of the debtor").
120. 11 U.S.C. § 541 (1994).
12L A Chapter 7 debtor is entitled to exemptions in property to the extent that the
value of the property less the liens permits, 11 U.S.C. § 522 (1994), and to property that
is excluded from the estate altogether. 11 U.S.C. §541(b)-(d) (1994).
122. Phillips v. Phillips (In re Phillips), 187 B.R. 363 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1995).
123. Id. at 369.
124. Woodworth v. Woodworth (In re Woodworth), 187 B.R. 174, 177 n.1 (Bankr.
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§ 523(a)(15XA). Inclusion of exempt property should cause debtors some alarm. Exemptions, whether in the context of bankruptcy or other debtor/creditor relations, place a limit on the extent to which a creditor may collect a debt. That is, irrespective
of the level of indebtedness, exemptions protect a minimal level
of the debtor's assets, so that his home and person are not
stripped bare by creditors seeking the payments to which they
are entitled. This serves the public policy of preventing debtors
and their families from unnecessarily becoming dependents of
the state. Including exempt property in the § 523(a)(15)(A) analysis arguably abrogates the policy that exempt property not be
available to creditors in satisfaction of the debtor's liabilities.
Several bankruptcy courts have concluded that a Chapter
13 debtor's exempt income can nevertheless be included in his
disposable income under § 1325(b)(2). 125 The reasoning behind
this conclusion rests in the language of § 1325(b)(2), specifically
in the lack of any qualifier of the term "income." The absence of
express qualifying language suggests that disposable income is
not limited to that which is not exempt. The "income or property" language of § 523(a)(15)(A), which is not applicable to
Chapter 13 proceedings, is likewise not qualified, supporting a
similar conclusion that the debtor's exempt property be considered in determining whether he can pay his domestic
obligations.
This reasoning may not be fully applicable in Chapter 7
however. A Chapter 13 debtor need not worry about being
stripped bare because he retains his propertyu28 in exchange for
his obligation to devote all or a significant portion of his disposND. Ohio 1995). The Woodworth court should have included in this brief definition property acquired post-petition, which is excluded from property of the estate in Chapter 7
cases. 11 U.S.C. § 541(aX6) (1994).
125. In re Minor, 177 B.R. 576 (Bankr. ED. Tenn. 1995) (workers compensation payment, although exempt under state law, must be included as part of debtors' disposable
income); In re Jackson, 173 B.R. 168 (ED. Mo. 1994) (same); In re Watters, 167 B.R. 146
(S.D. MI 1994) (included personal injury damages award taken as a personal exemption
pursuant to § 522 of the federal scheme); In re Schnabel 53 B.I& 809, 815-16 (Bankr.
N.D. l 1993) (pension and social security payments are income received by the debtor,
that such income is exempt is irrelevant). But see In re Solomon, 67 F.d 1128, 1132 (4th
Cir. 1995) (court cannot require debtor to withdraw exempt IRA assets to fund Chapter
13 plan where, although eligible to make withdrawals without penalty, debtor elects not
to take distributions).
126. Not only does the Chapter 13 debtor retain possession of property of the estate
pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1306(b) (1994), but upon confirmation of his plan that property
once again belongs to the debtor, free and clear of claims of creditors. 11 U.S.C.
§ 1327(b), (c) (1994).
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able income to his creditors over the life of his payment plan. 27
Therefore, the policy behind exemptions is unaffected. Chapter
7, in contrast, provides for a liquidation of the debtor's nonexempt property, greatly increasing the significance of retained assets to the debtor. Including the debtor's exempt property in the
determination of whether he is unable to pay his domestic debts
arguably permits the creditor spouse to reach even further into
the debtor's assets than the applicable exemption scheme generally permits. While the policy served by exemptions is still met
insofar as § 523(a)(15)(A) excludes property that is reasonably
necessary for the debtor's support, the manner in which that
policy could be undercut suggests that Congress may not have
intended that § 523(a)(15)(A)'s property include that which is
exempt.
On the other hand, § 523 (a)(15)(A) does not call for immediate payment of the debtor's domestic obligations, only an examination of whether the totality of his income and property enable him to pay. Upon a finding of nondischargeability, the
creditor spouse must still use state law collection procedures if
the debtor fails to fulfill his obligation, and the debtor's exempt
assets are off-limits to the creditor spouse for these purposes.
Thus, for a § 523(a)(15)(A) determination, it is not the availability, but the value of the debtor's exempt property that may be
relevant.
Other property of the debtor is relevant to the determination. This would include property acquired by the debtor post8 which is not property of the estate, and property of
petition,m2
the estate that the trustee may abandon to the debtor during or
at the conclusion of the bankruptcy proceeding.129 It would also
include the debtor's property that never became part of the
bankruptcy estate. 130 Of particular importance to the creditor
spouse is the exception found at § 541(c)(2), which enforces in
bankruptcy a restriction on the debtor's ability to transfer his
interest in a beneficial trust, if that restriction is enforceable
under applicable nonbankruptcy law. 131 Certain pension funds
have been specifically held to fit within this exception,'3 2 creat127. The length of the plan is usually three years, but may be extended up to five
years with court approval 11 US.C. § 1322(d) (1994).
128. 11 U.S.C. § 541(aX7) (1994).
129. 11 U.S.C. § 554 (1994).

130. 11 U.S.C. § 541(b), (cX2) (1994).
131. 11 U.S.C. § 541(cX2) (1994).
132. Patterson v. Shumate, 504 U.S. 753 (1992). Patterson concerned the antialienation clause in pension funds required by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). Holding that the clause was covered by § 541(c)(2), the Court
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ing what could be a valuable resource from which the debtor is
able to pay his domestic obligations. The creditor spouse should
therefore closely examine the debtor's schedules for such a pension fundm and any other property that is excluded from property of the estate.m
That § 1325(b)(2)'s "reasonably necessary" element is quite
controversial cannot be ignored. Aside from expenses for obvious
luxuries, there is no bright line test for determining whether a
particular expense of a particular debtor is reasonably necessary
to support him and his dependents. Ultimately, the determination "is and ought to be based on the judge's own opinion, for
the judge is, in § 1325(b)(2) decision-making, the hypothetical
reasonable person."1us Without an easy case of a debtor attempting to justify a lavish lifestyle, courts are understandably uncomfortable imposing their value judgments upon debtors:
In short, the court cannot and should not order debtors to alter their
lifestyles where there is no obvious indulgence in luxuries, even where
one or more unsecured creditors demand such a change. To engage in
such close judgments and supervision would be to contravene the intent
of Congress. It would also place impossible burdens on the court in determining the absolute necessity of every expense in each debtor's budget.uo
essentially excepted all ERISA qualified pension funds from property of the estate. Id. at
760.
133. Schedule B, Item 11, requires an itemized list of the debtor's interests in IRA,
ERISA, Keogh, or other pension or profit sharing plans.
134. The Congressional decision to examine a debtor's inability to pay based on his
income and property is, on the whole, a great disservice to the creditor spouse. My
hunch is that this provision was simply not given the careful consideration it deserved.
As Judge Brigner points out, the 1994 Bankruptcy reforms were a "mad rush to judgment," proceeding from introduction to presidential signature in a matter of weeks, and
which commanded less than three minutes total floor debate in both houses. Brigner,
supra note 5, at 16.
A discharge exception that is based in part on the value of the debtor's property
makes little sense when, at the initial stage of the bankruptcy proceeding, the debtor
has been stripped of most of that property. Even if the court does take into account the
value of the debtor's exempt property, the fate of the creditor spouse will depend on the
generosity of the applicable exemption scheme. Although the Code contains specific exemption provisions, 11 US.C. § 522(d) (1994), states may opt out of the Code and require
debtors to claim their exemption pursuant to the provisions of that state's statute. 11
U.S.C. § 522(b) (1994). In a state where the debtor's exemptions are very limited, it
would be extremely difficult to convince the court that exempt property is not reasonably
necessary to the debtor's support. Thus, the protection Congress sought to extend to the
creditor spouse may prove to be illusory.
135. In re Gonzales, 157 B.R. 604, 607-08 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1993).
136. In re Navarro, 83 B.R. 348, 355 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988) (quoting Collier,
S 1325.08[4][b] at 1325-48 to 1325-49).
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The disposable income analysis, like the Code itself, seems
to contemplate an institutional creditor that must accept the
courts' unwillingness to force debtors into monastic lifestyles.
Regardless of any negative feelings that individuals may have
about bankruptcy, it is difficult to pity a profit-rich bank or
other lending institution that goes unpaid while a debtor is permitted to live somewhat near the level of comfort to which he
had become accustomed before bankruptcy. In contrast, the creditor in § 523(a)(15)(A) proceedings is a human being who, quite
unwittingly, has had the label "creditor" thrust upon her. This is
not to say that a debtor should be forced to subsist on bread and
water in order to pay his domestic obligations. But the burden
of paying for a debtor's fresh start must be borne by society,
rather than a particular individual. Admittedly, this point asks
courts to impose its values to a greater degree upon the debtor,
but such imposition is necessary. As one commentator notes,
"the disheartening statistics showing the direct financial consequences of divorce on women and children" justify aggressive policing of the reasonableness of the debtor's expenses. 13 7 Principles of equity and of basic human decency require that a
bankrupt individual should forego some of life's niceties when
holding otherwise would cause the debtor's former spouse to fall
into poverty.m
Another important difference between § 523(a)(15)(A) and
§ 1325(b)(2) is the time at which the debtor's inability to pay
should be measured. In Chapter 13, the debtor's disposable income is measured as of the effective date of the plan, 3 9 and the
plan itself is subject to modification should changes in the
137. Michaela M. White, Issues in Bankruptcy and the 1994 Amendments; Divorce
After the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994: Can You Stay Warm After You Split the Blanket?, 29 CREiGHTON L REV. 617, 635 & n.110 (1996).
138. Not all courts agree that only the debtor's luxurious expenses should be eliminated and that some sacrifices may be required by the debtor in fulfilling the obligations
of a Chapter 13 proceeding. The court in In re Jones, 55 B.R. 462, 466 (Bankr. D. Mnn.
1985) noted the parallel between the exemption scheme, which provides that a debtor
may keep only a minimel amount of property necessary to his support, and the "reasonably necessary" requirement of § 1325(bX2). According to the Jones court, "the purpose
of chapter 13 is to provide the maximum recovery to creditors while at the same time
leaving the debtor sufficient money to pay his or her basic living expenses" Id. Fulfilling
this purpose requires that the debtor's expenses be examined for excess. There is some
indication that courts might require a similar sacrifice on the part of the debtor in
§ 523(aX15XA) determinations. For example, in McGinnis v. McGinnis (In re McGinnis),
194 B.R. 917 (Bankr. ND. Ala. 1996), the court found that the debtor could partially satisfy her domestic obligations by reducing her standard of living even though her lifestyle
was not an extravagant one. Id. at 922.
139. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(bX1XB) (1994).
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debtor's income occur.140 Because § 523(a)(15)(A) provides
neither a specific temporal reference nor the opportunity for
modification, courts have endeavored to determine the time best
suited for examination.141 It appears clear that, unlike
§ 523(aX5), courts will not use the time of the divorce. 142 Courts
have identified three general temporal reference points: the filing of the petition, 143 a specific point during the bankruptcy proceeding,1" or the period that follows the debtor's discharge, in
which case the court considers the debtor's prospective ability to
pay.14
140. 11 U.SC. § 1329 (1994).
141. The court in Humiston v. Huddleston (In re Huddleston), 194 B.R. 681, 686
(Bankr N.D. Ga. 1996) describes the evolution process of this issue, and the difficulty
courts must face in the absence of guidance from Congress:
Through a resulting process of evolution, members of the bench have shifted
incrementally from espousal of a measurement focusing upon circumstances as
of the debtor's filing for bankruptcy to one examining the facts as they exist at
the time of trial, moving each time to a different point of inquiry as the inadequacies of its predecessor become apparent.
142. Becker v. Becker (In re Becker), 185 B.R. 567, 570 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1995)
('Section 523(aX15) is concerned with the relative positions of the parties at the time of
the bankruptcy, not at the time of the divorce"). Except in the Sixth Circuit, where the
parties' financial circumstances at the time of the bankruptcy are sometimes relevant to
the court's decisions, the inquiry under § 523(aX5) generally focuses on the circumstances at the time the divorce decree was entered by the state domestic relations court.
143. Id.; Carroll v. Carroll (In re Carroll), 187 B.R. 197, 200 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1995).
The Carrollcourt did not explain why it decided to measure the debtor's inability to pay
as of the filing of the bankruptcy petition. It merely stated that § 523(aX15) is not concerned with the relative financial positions of the parties at the time they divorced. Id.
at 201. In its discussion of the rebalancing required by § 523(aX15)(B), the court observed that the debtor had already received his discharge, id., which indicates that Carroll did not limit the inquiry to the debtor's financial condition when he commenced his
bankruptcy case.
144. The two relevant points during the actual proceeding are the filing of the creditor spouse's complaint and the date of trial. The latter has proved more popular. Compare Hill v. Hill (In re Hill), 184 B.R. 750, 754 (Bankr. N.D. IML 1995) (measures at filing
of complaint), with Gantz v. Gantz (In re Gantz), 192 B.R. 932, 934 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.
1996) (time of trial). Hill and Gantz were both decided by Judge DeGunther, whose discussion in Gantz is representative of the general evolution of this issue in the courts.
Not only did Judge DeGunther recognize that relevant financial changes could occur between the filing of the complaint and the trial, id., he also indicated that the date of the
trial itself is only a starting point in the inquiry. Id. at 935. But see Campbell v. Campbell (In re Campbell), 198 B.R. 467, 473-74 (Banka D.S.C. 1996) (uses time of trial stating that court should focus on present financial condition of the parties instead of "engaging in hopeless speculation about the future"). Id. at 474 (quoting In re Crompton, 73
BIR 800, 808 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987)).
145. Cleveland v. Cleveland (In re Cleveland), 198 B.R. 394, 398 (Bankr. NJ). Ga.
1996); Johnston v. Henson (In re Henson), 197 B.&. 299, 303-04 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1996);
Humiston v. Huddleston (In re Huddleston), 194 B.I 681, 687 (Bankr. ND. Ga. 1996);
McGinnis v. McGinnis (In re McGinnis), 194 B.R. 917, 920 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1996); In re
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Use of the date of the petition is singularly unfair to the
creditor spouse. It is a fairly safe assumption that the debtor's
financial circumstances are at their worst on the date the petition is filed; bankruptcy is often commenced because a debtor is
simply unable to meet all of his financial obligations. As one
court opined, the debtor's petition may create a presumption
that he is unable to pay.14 Use of the petition date ignores the
fact that the debtor will soon be released from many, if not all,
of the financial obligations that led him to the bankruptcy court
in the first place. Failing to account for the overall relief the
debtor will ultimately receive "threatens to provide a windfall at
the expense of innocent ex-spouses."' 47
Courts measuring the debtor's inability to pay at some point
during the bankruptcy proceeding do so in order to take account
of changes in the debtor's financial circumstances that have occurred since he filed his bankruptcy petition. This approach appears to be more of a rejection of the date of the petition rather
than of a more forward-looking examination. Thus, this measurement may be more of an evolutionary stage in
§ 523(a)(15XA) analysis. For example, the court in In re Willey' 48
found the date of trial to be the appropriate point of measurement because relevant evidence was introduced as to the
changed financial conditions of both the debtor and the creditor
spouse. 49 The Willey court went on to note that in an appropriate case a different standard might be used. 50 Similarly, in In
re Greenwalt,"' the court specifically adopted a standard that
measures the inability to pay as of the trial, but it nevertheless
considered
financial changes that were to occur up to a year
6 2
later.1
Taking into account the debtor's prospective ability to pay is
clearly the equitable standard and most appropriate in fulfilling
legislative intent of protecting creditor spouses. Under this analysis, the court avoids a "snapshot" of the debtor's financial condition that, depending upon the particular facts, would work
Smither, 194 B.R. 102, 107 (Bankr. W). Ky. 1996).
146. Kessler v. Butler (In re Butler), 186 B.RI 371, 374 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1995).
147. Huddleston, 194 B.R. at 687 n.1.
148. Wiley v. Wley (In re Willey), 198 B.R. 1007 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1996).
149. Id. at 1014.
150. Id.
151. Greenwalt v. Greenwalt (In re Greenwalt), 200 B.& 909 (W.D. Wash. 1996).
152. Id at 914. Specifically, the court considered that the debtor had only one year
remaining on a car loan and that his child support arrearage would soon be satisfied.
The court also required the debtor to defer an $85.00 monthly expense for home maintenance in order to satisfy his domestic obligations. Id.

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45

highly inequitable results. In a thorough and well-reasoned
analysis of this issue, the court in In re Huddleston stated:
Whether measured at the petition date or time of trial, the adopted 'snap
shot version of the disposable income test fails to take into account the
nature of the analysis at hand-the debtor's 'ability to pay' a debt, if that
debt is declared nondischargeable. Unlike any analysis under section
1325(b)(2), which actually turns on the ability to make payments in
bankruptcy, section 523(aX15) looks beyond to the debtor's ability to pay
after the bankruptcy event. Indeed, any standard which focuses on the
debtor's current financial burden without taking into account the effect
of his impending discharge may not be said to properly measure the
debtor's ability to pay a divorce-related debt upon its relegation to
nondischargeability. If nothing else, simple equity, as well as the test
and policy of section 523(aX15), demands a broader inquiry than that
based upon a 'snap-shote which fails to take into account impending
changes in the scope of the debtor's financial obligationsu

Examining the debtor's prospective ability to pay allows for
proper consideration of equitable issues, instead of limiting the
analysis to a pure comparison of the debtor's "bottom line" as of
a specified date between the filing of the petition and discharge.15 It also allows the courts to weed out those less than
honest debtors who attempt to control the outcome of the case
by purposely reducing income, increasing expenses, or both. 155 In
153. Huddleston, 194 B.R. at 687 (internal citations and quotations omitted). But cf.
Soforenko v. Soforenko (In re Soforenko), 203 B.R& 853, 864 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1997).
Soforenko adds an ironic twist to the notion that equity demands consideration of the

debtor's impending discharge. Mrs. Soforenko argued nondischargeability under both
§ 523(a)(5) and (15), and the court held all but one of the debts constituted nondischargeable support. I& at 864. The remaining debt was discharged, however, because
the nondischargeable support obligations pushed the debtor's expenses beyond his income. Id. On a related note, the court omitted from its examination the debtor's proprietary interest in his law firm, instead considering only his income. Section 523(aX15XA)
specifically states that the debtor's property be included in determining his inability to
pay. Although the proprietary interest in the law firm became property of the estate, 11
U.S.C. § 541(a) (1994), that interest would likely have been of little value to the trustee
and, consequently the debtor's other creditors, in which case the trustee would abandon
the property back to the debtor. 11 U.S.C. § 554(a) (1994). See supra notes 119-133 and
accompanying text.
154. As one court stated: "Section 523(aX15)(A) does not restrict the court's inquiry
to a 'present' ability to pay the debt nor should it, since to impose or imply such a restriction would in many, if not most cases, render the provision's objective a nullity"
Straub v. Straub (In re Straub), 192 B. 522, 528-29 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1996).
155. m See, eg., Dressler v. Dressler (In re Dressier), 194 B.R. 290, 301 n. 27
(Bankr. DIL. 1996) (court must "ensure (debtor's] reaffirmed and postpetition indebtedness does not unreasonably suppress" ability to pay); Florio v. Florio (In re Florio), 187
B.R. 654, 657 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1995) (court will consider whether debtor willfully or
negligently became unemployed) (citing O'Brien v. Household Bank FSB (In re O'Brien),

1997]

IRRECONCILABLE DIFFERENCES

Huddleston, for example, the court was concerned that the
debtor's present inability to pay was in large part due to his
lack of diligence in attempting to secure employment.156
Also relevant to the debtor's inability to pay is whether the
court will take into account the income of the debtor's current
spouse.15 7 A literal application of § 523(a)(15)(A) produces the
most inequitable of results in this respect because the language
does not seem to allow consideration of the debtor's current
spouse's income. Because the "property" element of
§ 523(a)(15)(A) is so frequently overlooked, most courts simply
look to see if the debtor has any money remaining each month
after paying the expenses reasonably necessary for his support
and for the support of his dependents. A remarried debtor will
nearly always have higher expenses than his single counterpart,
but those additional expenses are frequently matched, at least
in part, by the current spouse's income. The result is that all of
the debtor's additional expenses are factored into the analysis,
while any additional means of paying them are factored out.
This scenario has been played out in the bankruptcy courts.
As one court stated, "[t]he fact that the income of [the] former
husband's nondebtor spouse is also applied toward these expenses is irrelevant to this discussion. Section 523 simply asks
whether [the] former husband can pay the debt from his income
or assets."1 8 Regarding the debtor's increased expenses, the
court in In re Hill was persuaded by the fact that the debtor's
new wife had two children and that, although the debtor was
165 B.R. 456, 460 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1994)); Greenwalt, 200 B.R. at 914-15 ("debtor
should not be permitted to direct the outcome of this proceeding by voluntarily manipulations of either his income or his expenditures").
156. Huddleston, 194 B.R. at 690.
157. I refer to this additional source of income as belonging to the debtor's "spouse"
because that is the factual posture in the majority of cases. Whether income of the
debtor's live-in companion will be considered is unclear. One court was concerned with
the public policy of including such income, stating that 'no case law has ever imputed or
considered the income of a debtor's girlfriend, and this Court will not consider same, as
it could lead to a chilling effect on the courtship and re-marriage of divorced partners.'
Willey v. Willey (In re Wiley), 198 B.R. 1007, 1015 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1996). But cf. Cleveland v. Cleveland, (In re Cleveland), 198 BR. 394, 398-99 (N.D. Ga. 1996), in which the
court was more concerned with effectuating the purpose of the statute, id., concluding
that it would be unable to "determine exactly what quantum of the debtor's own income
truly is 'necessary' for the support of himself" without taking into account the "debtabsorbing impact" of the income contributed by the live-in companion. Id. at 399.
158. Phillips v. Phillips (In re Phillips), 187 BR 363, 369 (Bankr M.D. Fla. 1995).
For clarification, the 'non-debtor spouseP to whom the court refers is the debtor's present
spouse. See also Carter v. Carter (In re Carter), 189 BR. 521, 522 (Bankr. M.D. Fla.
1995) (determination of ability to pay "not enhanced by inquiring into the financial circumstances of" debtor's current spouse).
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under no legal obligation to support them, their expenses should
nevertheless be considered in determining his inability to pay. 9
Nor does it ease the inequity to say that, although income
of the debtor's current spouse will not be considered in determi ng whether the debtor can pay the debt, such income will
be a factor in balancing the relative effects of discharge under
§ 523(a)(15)(B). 60 If the court determines that the married
debtor is unable to pay the domestic obligations, § 523(a)(15)(B)
becomes irrelevant. Because § 523(a)(15) is in the disjunctive,
the debtor's proof that he is unable to pay the debts ends the inquiry and the domestic obligations are discharged.
Ironically, while courts have willingly adopted the disposable income analysis found in Chapter 13, many have apparently
overlooked the case law that supports inclusion of a current
spouse's income. In fact, most courts consider the income of the
debtor's spouse in Chapter 13 cases, notwithstanding language
similar to § 523(a)(15)(A) that appears to limit the inquiry solely
to the debtor's income. This body of Chapter 13 case law recognizes that the debtor's disposable income cannot be accurately
determined without including all resources available to him, including the income of his current spouse.161 As one court noted,
"excluding the income of the debtor's current spouse forces the
debtor's creditors to subsidize part of the wife's living expenses,
a result not contemplated by the Code."1 62 Moreover, it seems
logical and fair to include the income of the debtor's spouse
when the debtor's expenses are increased precisely because he
has remarried.
E. The Benefit/DetrimentAnalysis: § 523(a)(15)(B)
Section 523(a)(15)(B) gives the debtor who is able to pay his
domestic obligations a second chance at discharging them if,
on
balance, his need for discharge is greater than the harm suffered by his former spouse from nonpayment. The decisions rendered in the short history of § 523(a)(15)(B) are widely divergent, and attempting to synthesize the case law for the purpose
of comprehensive discussion is no easy task. Thematically, however, there are a few common threads among many of the cases,
which demonstrate much of what is wrong with § 523(a)(15)
159. Hill v.Hill (In re Hill), 184 B.&. 750, 755 (N.D. Ill.
1995).
160. Celani v. Celani (In re Celani), 194 B.R. 719, 721 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1996).
161. In re Belt, 106 BI. 553 (N.D. Ind. 1989) (citing In re Strong, 84 B.IR 541, 543
(Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1988)); In re Saunders, 60 B.P&187, 188 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1986).
162. In re Schnabel, 153 B.R. 809, 818 (Bankr. N.D. MI1.1993).
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generally. Despite its intent to expand the scope of nondischargeable domestic obligations, Congress dropped the ball. The
statutory language requires an amorphous and standardless balancing of "benefits" and "detriments." The statute's legislative
history, which contradicts not only the statute but also its own
language, is useless as a guide. It is little wonder that bankruptcy judges refer to the statute as a "paving stone on the163road
to the region of Hades reserved for litigation nightmares."
From the outset, note that once the court determines that
the debtor has the ability to pay the debts, it seems unnecessary
to inquire further. The domestic relations court already balanced
164
the interests of the parties based on a wide variety of factors,'
and that balance is reflected in the decree. Any alteration of
that decree in the debtor's favor produces a benefit to him and a
detriment to the creditor spouse. Congress, however, has mandated further inquiry. Perhaps this mandate reflects a concern
for the rare debtor who has a minimal ability to pay, but whose
former spouse enjoys a very high post-divorce level of financial
comfort.165 In any event, in enacting § 523(a)(15)(B) Congress
has effectively conferred upon disgruntled divorce litigants a
right to challenge and possibly eliminate the provisions of a divorce decree that the debtor finds unfavorable. This may not
have been intended, but it is the law.
The bankruptcy courts, in fulfilling the Congressional mandate, must attempt to interpret the benefit/detriment language
in a way that may be applied both consistently and equitably.
There is no analogous doctrine on which to rely because
§ 523(a)(15)(B) is unique to the Code in requiring an inquiry
into the intrinsic value of discharge to the debtor. Not only must
the courts start from scratch, they must also use slippery terms
that do not lend themselves to a coherent, articulate standard.
The court in In re Crosswhite discussed at length the difficulty
inherent in § 523(a)(15)(B):
One court has observed that § 523(a)(15)(B) 'essentially requires this
court to make a value judgment in deciding which party suffers the
163. See In re Smither, 194 BR. 102, 106 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1996).
164. See Brigner, supra note 5.
165. See, ag., Taylor v. Taylor (In re Taylor), 191 B.R. 760 (N.D. nM. 1996), affd Taylor v. Taylor, 199 B.R. 37 (NJ). 111. 1996), which presents a nice--albeit rare-lustration
of this concern. While married, the Taylors ran a very successful business. When the
couple divorced, Ms. Taylor apparently took the business savvy with her, earning income
that was "nany multiples' of the debtors. Id. at 763. Needless to say, the court allowed
the debtor to discharge the domestic obligations., id. at 767, but the court did acknowledge that this case was not a typical scenario. Id.

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45

most' This may be what Congress had in mind, but, with all due respect,
value judgments are for Congress to make and for the courts to implement, guided by the standards that Congress has set forth in the statute
.... Without any legislative guidance on how to go about balancing the
debtor's benefit against the creditor's detriment, the statute appears to
give the bankruptcy court seemingly standardless discretion in determining whether or not the debt will be discharged. For all the guidance it
has chosen to give, Congress might just as well have said that whether
these types of debts will be discharged will depend upon whether or not
the bankruptcy judge think they should be. 16

The benefit/detriment inquiry must begin with a proper understanding of the language of the statute. Section 523(a)(15)(B)
excepts domestic debts from discharge unless discharging such
debt would result in a benefit to the debtor that outweighs the
detrimental consequences to a spouse, former spouse, or child of
the debtor.167 The plain language makes clear that the scales
must actually tip in favor of the debtor. Put another way, the
statute requires the debtor to demonstrate why he ought to be
relieved from his domestic obligations, and his reasons must
sufficiently justify imposing upon the creditor spouse the detrimental consequences of the discharge. More important, implicit
in the plain language of the statute is the recognition that the
interests of the parties have already been balanced-by the
state domestic relations court. Without a showing that the
debtor receives a benefit beyond the mere fact of being relieved
from his domestic obligations, the balancing done by the state
court ought to be preserved. As the court in In re Jodoin noted,
"§ 523(a)(15) must be read as fundamentally an effort in the
Bankruptcy Code to accommodate a powerful, competing
nonbankruptcy policy."168 The policy to which the Jodoin court
refers is that of the state domestic relations court.
Unfortunately for the creditor spouse, the plain language of
the statute is not always strictly followed. This is in part due to
the convoluted legislative history to which the courts have
looked in attempting to interpret and apply § 523(a)(15)(B). Notwithstanding the unambiguous language that the debtor must
derive a benefit from discharge that is greater than the detrimental consequences to the creditor spouse, courts have seized
upon language in the legislative history suggesting that, absent
substantial detriment to the creditor spouse, the debt should be
166. Ginter v. Crosswhite (In re Crosswhite), No. 94-11659, 1996 US. Bankr. LEXIS
1708, at *18 (N.D. Ind. July 3, 1996) (citations omitted).
167. 11 US.C. § 523(aX15XB) (1994).
168. Samayoa v. Jodoin (In re Jodoin), 196 B.& 845, 853 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1996).
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discharged. 16 9
Worse still, if the legislative history is to be used as an interpretive guide, the creditor spouse must walk a very fine line
between proving her case and proving too much. Generally, the
creditor spouse's financial condition bears an inverse relationship to the detriment. That is, as the creditor spouse's financial
condition worsens, the weight of the detrimental consequences
she suffers increases. But there is a point at which her financial
condition is so bad that the detriment begins to lessen or even
disappear. Drawing from the legislative history of § 523(a)(15),
some courts have held that where the creditor spouse has
neither money nor assets from which the debts can be collected,
there is little or no detriment and the debts are discharged. 170

Similarly, debtors have been allowed to discharge their domestic
obligations where the creditor spouse is already so burdened by

significant amounts of debt that her situation is hopeless,

whether or not the debts are discharged. 171 Taking this reasoning a step further, some courts have concluded that, where the
detriment to the creditor spouse is so great that it will likely
force her to file her own bankruptcy petition, that detriment disappears precisely because she can file for bankruptcy.172
169. See, e.g., In re Morris, 197 B. 236, 245 (Bankr. N.D. W. Va. 1996) ("Court is
mindful that 'the benefits of the debtor's discharge should be sacrificed only if there
would be substantial detriment to the nondebtor spouse that outweighs the debtor's need
for a fresh start' ").
170. That Congress could have come to this conclusion is amazing. Not only does
this definition of "little detriment" suffer from a deficiency of logic, it also displays a callous attitude toward the poor. Ignored are the long-term effects on the creditor spouse
who has neither income nor assets to pay these debts. Her credit rating will suffer, rendering her unable to obtain credit for some time or forcing her to obtain credit at very
high interest rates. Her bank accounts could be garnished, as could her wages, and garnishment of the latter could lead to her being fired from her job. This says nothing of
the stress she will endure, from telephone calls to lawsuits, as creditors attempt to collect their debts. Ultimately, what the legislative history of § 523(aX15) states is that for
the very poor (read "judgment proof") creditor spouse, the debtor's fresh start is sufficient justification for placing the first rung on the ladder out of poverty a bit further out
of her reach. As I recall hearing some years ago, you would have to be rich in the first

place to think like that.
171. Jenkins v. Jenkins (In re Jenkins), 202 BR. 102, 106 (1996); Willey v. Willey
(In re VWriley), 198 B.R. 1007, 1016 (Bankr. SD. Fla. 1996); In re Morris, 193 B.IL 949,
954-55 (Bankr. S.D. CaL 1996).
172. See, e.g., Hill v. Hill (In re Hill), 184 B.R. 750, 756 (Bankr. N.D. IL. 1995) ("discharge of debts by both parties strikes the Court as the most sensible solution"); Silvers
v. Silvers (In re Silvers), 187 B.R& 648, 649, (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1995) ("the only good decision the Court can conjure up is for the ex-spouse to file a petition for relief under Chapter 7"); In re Sinither, 194 BR. 102, 111 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1996) (eligibility for bankruptcy relief a factor in the analysis); Bodily v. Morris (In re Morris), 193 B.R. 949, 954
(Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1996) (creditor spouse "better off filing for bankruptcy to deal with her
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The legislative history of § 523(a)(15)(B) is neither in accord
with the language of the statute nor entirely consistent in itself.173 But there is no question that the statute prevails. Congress voted for, and the President signed, the statute. The legislative history is merely the staff's attempt to explain the actual
text enacted by the legislature. 17 4 Where the legislative history
appears to contradict the statute, as is the case with
§ 523(a)(15)(B), that legislative history should be given no effect.
That being said, the question of § 523(a)(15)(B)'s meaning
remains. If there is any consistency in § 523(a)(15)(B) analysis,
the general focus can be superficially described as relativity.
With respect to the creditor spouse, courts look to the effect of
discharge relative to her income and expenses; on the debtor's
side, it is the effect of discharge relative to his post-bankruptcy
financial condition. The relative harm to each party is then
measured to determine who suffers most. 7 5 If the court is lucky,
a large financial disparity between the parties will exist and the
decision will be an easy one. 17 6 The cases in which the degree of
harm is more or less the same obviously give courts more
trouble, and the outcome depends upon a number of considerations including the manner in which a given court characterizes
benefits and detriments, the use of the legislative history as an
interpretive guide, and the scope of inquiry deemed appropriate
by the court.
The debtor's benefit tends to be a function of his ability to
pay, his fresh start generally, or both. 77 Many courts analyze
debts"). But cf. Christison v. Christison (In re Christison), 201 B.R. 298, 311 (Bankr.
M.D. Fla. 1996) in which the court strongly responded to this approach, stating that
"courts should not be in the business of forcing innocent parties into bankruptcy because
they regard that as the lesser evil under Section 523(a)(15). Neither should one spouse
be able to force a non-filing creditor spouse into bankruptcy by using the exception contained in Section 523(aX15) of the Bankruptcy Code Id.
173. Indeed, the legislative history rests on a premise that is simply wrong, because
it states that § 523(a)(15) is meant to deal with property settlements and hold harmless
agreements that were accepted in exchange for lowered support payments. However,
such an exchange is nothing more than a change in form of a support obligation that is
nondischargeable under § 523(a)(5). Section 523(a)(15), by its own language, concerns
the dischargeability of domestic obligations that have no support component. HR REP.
No. 103-835, at 54 (1994) reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.CA.N. 3363.
174. In re Sinclair, 870 E2d 1340, 1344 (7th Cir. 1989).
175. Phillips v. Phillips (In re Phillips), 187 B.R. 363, 369 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1995).
176. See, e-g., Campbell v. Campbell (In re Campbell), 198 B.R. 467, 475 (Bankr.
D.S.C. 1996); Taylor v. Taylor (In re Taylor), 191 BR.L 760 (N.D. Ill. 1996), aff'd Taylor v.
Taylor, 199 B.& 37 (N.D. l. 1996); Samayoa v. Jodoin (In re Jodoin), 196 B.&. 845, 855
(Bank. E.D. Cal. 1996).
177. At least one court considered the debtor's non-financial benefits as well. Willey
v. Willey (In re Willey), 198 B.1 1007, 1016 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1996). Among the benefits
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the discharge of the domestic debts in conjunction with the
debtor's ability to pay, and debtors who would merely enhance a
comfortable level of disposable income may be denied discharge
-ofthe domestic obligations. 178
Too often, however, the fresh start itself is a principal benefit considered by the court.179 This is inappropriate. The purpose
of § 523(a)(15) and the general exception scheme of § 523(a) is
to fulfill the policy determination that, notwithstanding an individual's filing for bankruptcy, some debts must be paid. To use
the fresh start as a general consideration of the debtor's benefit
is to argue that Congress ought not to have provided the exception found in § 523(a)(15) at all. This is not to say that the fresh
start has no place in the analysis. It is entirely appropriate and
necessary to determine the extent to which the debtor is ridding
himself of debt separate from the domestic obligations owed.
Some courts have taken this approach, finding that because the
debtor would no longer be liable on a significant amount of debt
owed to parties other than his former spouse, the benefit of discharging the marital obligations was decreased when weighed
against the detrimental consequences to the creditor spouse. 80
This approach, however, can only be taken so far. If a substantial level of indebtedness is attributable to obligations arising from the decree, the debtor's motive in filing for bankruptcy
becomes suspect. Neither Congress nor the courts should permit
any debtor to use the bankruptcy process as a means of undoing
what the domestic court has done.1 81 Unfortunately, the strucdiscussed by the court were the debtor's ability to start a new family if he so chose and
relief from the possibility that his former wife would be dragging him into state court

the rest of his life in attempting to collect the domestic obligations. As for its precedential value, I believe (or hope) that Willey will be little more than an historical remnant
from the infancy of a confusing statute. My guess is that the Willey opinion was based
more on the courts reaction to a creditor spouse who had interfered with the discovery
process and who was less than honest with the court than it was with the statute itselL
178. See, eg., Carroll v. Carroll (In re Carroll), 187 B.RL 197, 201 (Bankr S.D. Ohio
1995) (discharge "would simply provide Debtor with additional disposable income to 'use
at his discretion'!").

179. Phillips, 187 B.R. at 369 (court discusses no benefit other than debtor's fresh
start); Willey, 198 B.R. at 1016 (benefits include fact that "policy favoring discharge and
narrowly construing and applying discharge exceptions is further served").
180. See eg., Campbell, 198 BIR at 475; Johnston v. Henson (In re Henson), 197
B.R. 299, 304 (Bankn E.D. Ark. 1996).
181. See Greenwalt v. Greenwalt (In re Greenwalt), 200 B.R. 909, 914 (Bankr. W.D.
Wash. 1996) ('While the fresh start is an important consideration, the debtor cannot be
permitted to use bankruptcy simply to evade marital obligations, in the absence of bona
fide financial problems").
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ture of the benefit/detriment test allows that result where the
most significant amount of debt stems from the decree.
Analysis of the creditor spouse's detriment is not guided by
any principle like that of the fresh start. In part because of judicial reliance on the legislative history, the focus of benefit/detriment analysis tends to shift almost exclusively to the creditor
spouse, and in many cases § 523(a)(15)(B) gives rise to a level of
scrutiny previously unknown to creditors in bankruptcy. Even in
courts that properly place the burden of proving entitlement to
discharge on the debtor, the creditor spouse must nonetheless
present
extensive evidence of her own financial circumstances,
mmic.king
the asset disclosures required of the debtor. Yet, the
ultimate irony is that the creditor spouse never voluntarily subjected herself to the Code's disclosure requirements because she
never sought relief from her debts. The court may impute income to her if she made an independent and legitimate decision
to leave her job.= Her inability to pay third-party debts will be
considered 8 3 and may in fact be required. 184 Evidence of
whether or not she has any assets is introduced with grave caution. At a minimum, she risks the cynical eye with which some
courts view arguments of detrimental consequences made by a
creditor spouse who has acquired some level of material comfort.' a Worse, the existence of assets may provide a source from

which a discharged debt may be collected, but without assets
she risks the 'judgment proof" label that renders her detriment
inconsequential. In short, she must be needy, but not so needy
that the court might find her own bankruptcy a better option
than requiring her former spouse to pay his domestic
obligations.
In comparing the above described benefits and detrimental
consequences, courts are increasingly using the "totality of the
182. In re Smither, 194 B.R. 102, 111 (Bankr. W.D. K. 1996) (court imputed to creditor spouse the income she had been earning before leaving her job to return to college, a
decision the court admits was made with 'valid and good faith reasons); Jenkins v. Jenkins (In re Jenkins), 202 B.&. 102, 105-06 (Bankr. C.D. IlM. 1996) (expressing concern
that creditor spouse had capacity to earn income equal to debtor, but had underemployed hersel.
183. See &g., Carrol, 187 B.RI at 201 (creditor spouse's inability to pay a factor to

consider); Campbell, 298 B.RK at 475 (same); Cleveland v. Cleveland (In re Cleveland),
198 B.R. 394, 400 (Bankr. NJ). Ga. 1996) (same).
184. Jenkins, 202 B.R at 105.
185. See, ag., Soforenko v. Soforenko (In re Soforenko), 203 B.R. 853, 858 (Bankr. D.
Mass. 1997) (making point that creditor spouse had "somehow managed to accumulate
significant savings"); Willey v. Willey (In re Wiley), 198 B.R. 1007, 1010 (Bankr. S.D.
Fla. 1996) (court noted, inter alia, that creditor spouse was employed full-time at a
"modest wage," had her own apartment, owned a new car, and 'dined out occasionally).
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circumstances" test, which the court in In re Crosswhite86 described as an effort by the courts to avoid the standardless discretion that they do not like and are not supposed to have. The
Crosswhite court articulated the problem with this test, stating:
While this approach is better than none at all, it is not particularly useful. Initially, it seems far too broad and suggests that just about anything the parties may want to offer may be worthy of consideration. As a
result it has an unfortunate tendency to generate lists of factors that
should be considered-lists which grow ever larger as the case law
develops.m
In re Carroll,which seems to be the starting point for many
courts, examined the income and expenses of both parties, the
nature of the debts, and whether the creditor spouse was able to
pay the debts.' 8 Carroll is frequently cited for its use of these
factors, and they frequently appear in the ever expanding
lists.189 Instead of discussing at length how the various factors
have affected the outcome in particular cases, it seems more
useful to focus on a few specific factors based on their commonality of use and implications for future § 523(a)(15)(B) analysis.
The first factor is, absurdly, whether the creditor spouse is
eligible for bankruptcy relief " As previously discussed, the legislative history to § 523(a)(15)(B) considers the detrimental consequences to the judgment-proof creditor spouse to be insignificant. Judicial reliance on the legislative history has led some
courts to conclude that the best resolution of particular cases involves a discharge of the debtor's domestic obligations followed
by the creditor spouse's own petition for bankruptcy relief.191
Even assuming that the facts of those cases made the conclusion
a practical one, allowing it to rise to the level of a factor to be
considered generally is wholly inappropriate. Not only does such
a consideration border on a de facto involuntary petition, 192 it
186. Ginter v. Crosswhite (Inre Crosswhite), No. 94-11659, 1996 U.S. Bankr. LEXIS
1798, at *1 (N.D. Ind. July 3, 1996).
187. Crosswhite, 1996 U.S. Bankr. LEXIS 1708, at *18.

188. Carroll, 187 B.R at 201.
189. E.g., Christison v. Christison (In re Christison), 201 B!R 298 (Bankr. M.D. Fla.
1996) (six factors); Morris v. Morris (In re Morris), 197 BI. 236, 245 (Bankr. N.D. W. Va.
1996) (seven factors); Smither, 194 BR. at 111 (eleven factors); Carroll, 187 B.R. at 201

(three factors).
190. See eg., Smither, 194 B.R. at 111.
191. Of course, the court cannot order the creditor spouse to file for bankruptcy, but
by placing additional financial burdens on the creditor spouse when she is barely making ends meet, a petition for relief will likely result.
192. Cf 11 U.S.C. § 303 (1994).
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also rests on the mistaken assumption that the consequences of
filing for bankruptcy are not significantly detrimental. 19 3 For
reasons that are entirely up to her, the creditor spouse might
not want to file for bankruptcy.194 Use of this factor is
indefensible.
The "nature of the obligation" is a factor considered by most
courts. 95 Though seldom defined, this factor likely calls for a
distinction to be made between property settlements and hold
harmless agreements. Both are intended to come within the
scope of § 523(a)(15),'w but there is an important distinction between them. A property settlement requires payment from one
spouse to the other, whereas a hold harmless agreement is the
debtor's promise to relieve his former spouse from liability on a
debt owed to a third party creditor. Discharge of the former
leaves the creditor spouse without the money she is owed; discharge of the latter leaves her solely liable for the debt.
Among the few cases that discuss this distinction is In re
Hesson.197 That court interpreted the legislative history of
§ 523(a)(15) as contemplating three scenarios. The first is a
three-party arrangement-the hold harmless agreement-which
leaves the creditor spouse liable for the debt after the debtor re193. Qf Schmitt v. Schmitt Eubanks (In re Schmitt), 197 B.R 312, 317 (Bankr. W.D.
Ark. 1996) ("implication that a non-debtor would need to file bankruptcy because of anothers debt militates in his favor because it is a detriment to his financial status and
credit rating7).
194. See In re Raymond, 12 B.R. 906, 907 (Bankr. ED. Va. 1981). In a context unrelated to discharge of domestic obligations, the Raymond court stated:
Bankruptcy is a serious step; it holds its stigmas still. It is a unique judicial
process where one is laid bare, financially. And remember this-it results in a
court record for future employers, creditors, friends, relatives and the public to
see .... We perceive bankruptcy to be a very personal matter which only the
individual can voluntarily exercise.
Id. The far-reaching implications of bankruptcy-especially its effects on debtors and the
decisions they make-are beyond the scope of this article, but are extremely welladdressed in SULLIVAN ET AL, supra note 87. See also Lisa J. McIntyre, A Sociological
Perspective on Bankruptcy, 65 inn. LJ. 123 (1989) (discussing importance of sociological
research in moving toward an understanding the workings and consequences of consumer bankruptcy for individual debtors).
195. See, eg., Carroll v. Carroll (In re Carroll), 187 B.R. 197, 201 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio
1995); Campbell v. Campbell (In re Campbell), 198 B.R. 467, 475 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1996);
Christison v. Christison (In re Christison), 201 B.R. 298, 311 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1996);
Cleveland v. Cleveland (In re Cleveland), 198 B.R. 394, 400 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1996);
Florio v. Florio (In re Florio), 187 BR. 654, 658 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1995); Hill v. Hill (In re
Hill), 184 B.R. 750, 756 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1995); Morris v. Morris (In re Morris), 197 B.R.
236, 245 (Bankr. N.D. W. Va. 1996).
196. HR. REP. No. 103-835, at 54 (1994), reprinted in 1994 US.C.CA.N. 3363.
197. Collins v. Hesson (In re Hesson), 190 B.R. 229 (Bankr. D. Md. 1995).
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ceives his discharge. The second and third are both two-party
arrangements between the spouses, one being a property settlement that is accepted in exchange for lowered support and the
other being an evening up of the parties' financial affairs.5 8 The
Hesson case was concerned with the.last of these scenarios and
central to the court's finding the debt dischargeable was the fact
that the creditor spouse did not owe the money to any third
party. The court's statement regarding this conclusion is worth
quoting:
In a two-party scenario of § 523(aX15), short of a greater showing of a
present need, it is hard to conceive of a situation when the creditor
prevails. The judgment in this case is the same as it would have been
before the 1994 amendment. The result is mandated by Congress. It is
not by any measure a fair one, because it rewards irresponsibility. On

the other hand, no one should assume that life is fair.' "

Under this rationale, nearly all property settlement obliga-

tions that are merely equitable distributions from the divorce
would be discharged, for only the consequences of discharging
the hold harmless obligations are sufficiently detrimental to the
creditor spouse to justify depriving the debtor of his fresh start.
Hesson conceded that there could be a case in which the creditor
spouse is in need of the property settlement payment. But when
one considers that the creditor spouse in Hesson itself suffered
significant financial hardship as a result of the divorce, it is difficult to imagine circumstances in which that court2 °would refuse
the debtor's discharge of the domestic obligations. 0
More important is Hesson's reference to the two-party scenario in which the property settlement was awarded in exchange for lowered support payments. This comes straight from
the legislative history201 and underscores the proposition that
§ 523(a)(15) will lead to diminished, not enhanced, protection of
the creditor spouse. If a creditor spouse accepts a property settlement or a promise to be held harmless on joint obligations in
exchange for lowered support payments, that bargain concerns
198. Id. at 240.

199. Id- at 241. The harshness of the Hesson opinion leads me to wonder if Chief
Judge Mannes was also trying to demonstrate to Congress that if it sought to improve
the creditor spouse's position in enacting § 523(aX15), Congress failed.
200. Id at 232. According to the opinion, the creditor spouse 'testified that his savings were depleted, his phone was cut off, and he could not afford to continue his school
classes. He canceled his insurance and retirement plan. He sold practically everything
he owned in order to meet his obligations under the Agreement! He also paid in full a
$45,000 deficiency balance from the sale of the marital home. Id
201. Id at 240.

422

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45

nothing more than the form in which the support would be paid.
Congress never intended to disturb this precedent by enacting
§ 523(a)(15), which was supposed to reach only those obligations
that are not actually in the nature of support. Thus, when the
nature of the obligation involves a bargaining away of support,
the only proper response is that the debt is nondischargeable
under §523(a)(5)
without reference to any benefits or
20 2
detriments.
Finally, at least two cases have specifically included as a
consideration the debtor's bad faith in filing his petition for
bankruptcy. 20 3 In other cases, "bad faith" is not referred to as
such, but its consideration is apparent from the text.20 The bad
faith factor is among the more productive and sensible developments in § 523(a)(15) jurisprudence. Bankruptcy courts cannot
and should not provide quasi-appellate relief from state domestic relations orders when the debtor's motive is apparent. Although a good faith requirement permeates the Code, 205 courts
do not uniformly agree that a good faith filing requirement can
be read into a petition for bankruptcy relief.20 1 Including the
debtor's bad faith as a factor for consideration puts potential
debtors on notice that their motivations are relevant and may
deter some former divorce litigants from using the bankruptcy
forum as a means of perpetuating the pain and hostility that is
so common to a marital break-up.
202. Cf Samayoa v. Jodoin (In re Jodoin), 196 B.R. 845 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1998). The
court in In re Jodoin found nearly all of the debtor's domestic obligations nondischargeable under § 523(a)(5), even though the creditor spouse did not so argue in her complaint. Judge Klein reasoned that "§ 523(aX5) is, as a matter of law, necessarily in issue
in every action prosecuted under § 523(a)(15)" because of the statutory language that
the latter applies only to debts "not of the kind described" in § 523(a)(5). Id. at 851.
Judge Klein also relied on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, specifically Rule 15(b),
which permits courts to deem pleadings amended to conform to the evidence, and Rule
54(c), under which the "court is obliged to award the plaintiff the relief to which she is
entitled under the evidence adduced at trial... . Id
203. Patterson v. Patterson (In re Patterson), 199 B.RI 22, 24 (Bankr.W.D. Ky. 1996)
(citing In re Smither, 194 B.R. 102, 111 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1996)). In Patterson, this factor
was persuasive in holding the obligations nondischargeable. Id.
204. See, eg., Jodoin, 196 B.R. at 849 n.3 (court noted the "litigiousness and rigidity' demonstrated by the debtor in both the bankruptcy and divorce proceedings).
205. See, ag., 11 U.S.C. § 707(b) (1994) (court, on its own motion, may dismiss petition for substantial abuse of Chapter 7); § 727(a) (grounds for denying debtor his discharge); §§ 1129(a)(3), 1225(a)(3), 1325(aX3) (requiring debtor's good faith in filing reorganization plans).
206. See In re Landes, 195 B.P. 855 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1996) (refusing to recognize a
good faith filing requirement and discussing tests used by courts recognizing the
requirement).
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In sum, § 523(aX15) does not work. Its structure makes the
task of statutory construction a formidable one, and its legislative history is useless as a guide because it misunderstands the
very text it seeks to explain. Its procedural requirements, particularly that state courts are denied jurisdiction over
§ 523(aX15) matters, force bankruptcy courts to sit as "super-divorce" courts, in which the financial provisions of the decree are
relitigated, reconsidered, and redistributed. Worse, creditor
spouses discover that in this new divorce forum the policy that
drives the decision-making process is not the fair start policy of
the domestic relations court, but the fresh start to which her adversary, the debtor, is presumed to be entitled. Finally, the effect of § 523(aX15) more than perpetuates the harsh result of
the support/property settlement dichotomy that the statute was
intended to resolve; it worsens it. The support analysis is slowly
bleeding into § 523(aX15) decisions, suggesting that both the
statute and the courts contemplate a model of marriage and divorce that no longer exists. The creditor spouse whose standard
of living during marriage depended upon the income and status
of the debtor is most likely to prevail. Her more independent
counterpart suffers the consequences of her efforts, with little
regard to the state court determination that she was incapable
of bearing the financial consequences of the divorce by herself
IV. SECTION 523(A)(2)(A):
FALSE REPRESENTATION, FALSE PRETENSES OR AcTuAL FRAUD

Sections 523(aX5) and (15) both specifically concern domestic obligations arising from a decree of divorce. An alternative
theory available to the creditor spouse is § 523(a)(2)(A), which
excepts from discharge debts obtained by false pretenses, a false
representation, or actual fraud ("the fraud theory"). 20 This theory is seldom used by creditor spouses, but in appropriate circumstances it may prove to be a useful argument, at least as an
alternative theory to §§ 523(a)(5) and (15).208 This is particularly
207. Section 523(aX2XA) provides:
(a) A discharge under section 727 ...
vidual debtor from any debt -

of this title does not discharge an indi-

(2) for money, property, services, or an extension, renewal, or refinancing of

credit, to the extent obtained by

-

(A) false pretenses, a false representation, or actual fraud, other than a statement respecting the debtor's or an insider's financial condition.

11 U.S.C. § 523(aX2XA) (1994).
208. See, eg., Sterna v. Paneras (In re Paneras), 195 B.R. 395, 408 (Bankr. NJ). L
1996) in which the creditor spouse sought dischargeability under both the marital excep-
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true where the bankruptcy is filed a very short time after the final decree of divorce is issued and where the distribution represents is a settlement negotiated between the divorcing parties
themselves.
It is important to note that this exception should be raised
only when the facts substantially justify the claim. A claim
brought under § 523(a)(2) that is not substantially justified can
subject the creditor spouse to liability for the debtor's reasonable
attorney fees and costs of the proceeding."' In addition, this argument, like § 523(a)(15), may be raised only in an adversary
proceeding in the bankruptcy court within 60 days of the first
210
scheduled meeting of creditors.

Section 523(a)(2)(A) is more commonly used in the commercial context by institutional creditors attempting to show that,
because the debtor obtained a financial benefit211 through the
use of false pretenses, misrepresentation, or actual fraud, the
debt owed to that particular creditor should be excepted from
discharge. This is, of course, consistent with the premise that
only those unfortunate debtors who are honest are entitled to a
fresh start in bankruptcy. The creditor is generally required to
show that the debtor made a false representation that the
debtor knew to be false at the time of its making. Further, the
representation must have been made with the intention and
purpose of deceiving the creditor. The creditor must show justifiable2 reliance and an injury sustained as a proximate result of
the representation having been made. 213
The statute sets out "false pretenses," "false representation,"
and "actual fraud" as three distinct elements, but in actual ustions and under Section 523(aX2XA). The court found the debts in question to be neither
support nor nondischargeable property settlement. The debts were nevertheless held
nondischargeable under the fraud exception. Id.
209. 11 U.S.C. § 523(d) (1994).
210. FED. R BANKS. P. 4007(c).

211. Specifically, this financial benefit would consist of "money, property, services,
or an extension, renewal, or refinancing of credit." 11 U.S.C. § 523(aX2) (1994).
212. In Field v. Mans, 116 S. Ct. 437 (1995), the Supreme Court held that the creditor is held only to a justifiable reliance standard. Prior to this holding, courts required
reasonable reliance. Worthy of a passing note is that Field specifically concerned "actual
fraud" and not either false representation or false pretenses. The Court stated that it did
'not mean to suggest that the requisite level of reliance would differ" is a case involving
the latter two, it did state that it was unnecessary to decide that issue in the present
case. Id. at n.8. For a discussion of Field v. Mans and the justifiable reliance standard,
see Carrie Bland, Note, Field v. Mans and Justifiable Reliance Under Section
523(a)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code: Determining Who is an Experienced Horseman, 52
Bus. LAW. (1997).

213. In re Phillips, 804 F.2d 930, 932 (6th Cir. 1986).
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age, they converge into one. Fraud is the final product; misrepresentations or false pretenses are the means. A misrepresentation, for purposes of nondischargeability, is a statement
knowingly and fraudulently made by the debtor; a promise to be
executed in the future is insufficient, even though there is no
excuse for its subsequent breach.214 A false representation need
not be overt: "omissions or a failure to disclose on the part of
the debtor can constitute misrepresentations where the circumstances are such that omissions or failure to disclose
create a
215
false impression which is known by the debtor."
False pretenses, on the other hand, "has been defined as
'implied misrepresentations or conduct intended to create and
foster a false impression.' 216 Whereas misrepresentations would
refer to specific false statements made by the debtor in the divorce settlement negotiations, false pretenses would refer to his
general conduct in the process. False pretenses has been further
defined as
a series of events, activities or communications which, when considered
collectively, create a false and misleading set of circumstances, or false

and misleading understanding of a transaction, in which a creditor is
wrongfully induced by the debtor to transfer property or extend credit to
the debtor... A false pretense is usually, but not always, the product of

multiple events, acts or representations undertaken by a debtor which
purposely create a contrived and misleading understanding of a transaction that, in turn, wrongfully induces the creditor to extend credit to the
debtor. A 'false pretense' is established or fostered willfully, knowingly
and by design; it is not the result of inadvertence. 217

False pretenses in the context of divorce settlement negotiations would require examination of the debtor's conduct rather
than the specific statements that he made. In either event, the
deception is the same-that during the negotiation process, the
debtor secretly intends to file for bankruptcy after the divorce
becomes final. Having established intent and the deception, the
creditor spouse must prove her reliance on either the false representations or the false pretenses under which the negotiations
took place. The bankruptcy itself is the proximate cause of the
harm to the creditor spouse.
The case law in this area is limited but instructive. In In re
214. Pettigrew v. Smith (In re Smith), 61 B.R. 742, 747 (D. Mont. 1986) (citing 3
COLLIER ON BANKRuptCY, § 523.08, pp. 523-44 to 52).

215. Sterna v. Paneras (In re Paneras), 195 BI. 395, 406 (Bankr. N.D. IlL 1996).
216. I&
217. Id.
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Arterburn,21 the bankruptcy court denied discharge to a debtor
spouse who had filed for bankruptcy just four days after the divorce decree was entered. The court found that the debtor had
made a "deliberate misrepresentation7 regarding his promise to
hold his wife harmless on more than $9,000.00 in joint debt
from the marriage. 19 Absent this misrepresentation, the court
reasoned, the creditor spouse "would have gained divorce decree
settlement terms more favorable dollarwise than that agreed
upon and approved by the domestic relations court." 2 Crucial to
the finding of fraud was the debtor's timing; he waited only four
days to file his petition for bankruptcy, leading the court to conclude that he "had no intention of paying the designated
debts."221 Arterburn demonstrates the importance of arguing
nondischargeability under an appropriate exception other than
one applying strictly to domestic debts. Had the creditor spouse
not raised the fraud argument, she would have been liable for
the debts. The court found no indication that the debts were in
the nature of support,2m and there was no property settlement
exception in the Code at that time.
Relying on Arterburn, the bankruptcy court in In re
Brasher 223 denied discharge of obligations assumed by the
debtor pursuant to a divorce decree entered into 20 days prior to
the filing of the bankruptcy petition. The Brasher court stated
that it found
no substantial change in financial condition of the debtor in the twenty
days after the entry of the divorce decree to warrant any other inference
but that the petition was filed as part of his plan to induce the plaintiff
to waive alimony in return for his promise to pay debts he intended to
discharge in bankruptcy. 24

As in Arterburn, the timing was central to the finding of
fraud, although the Brasher court stated in a footnote that "the
time span between the divorce and bankruptcy petition is not
dispositive on the issue of fraud."2 This indicates that the court
218. Arterburn v. Arterburn (In re Arterburn), 15 B.R. 189 (Bankr. W.D. Okla.
1981).
219. Id. at 192.
220. Id.

221. Id.
222. Id. at 191 (MThere is no indication in the decree of divorce that the settlement
was made in lieu of alimony or in the nature of support.').
223. Brasher v. Brasher (In re Brasher), 20 B.R. 408 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1982).
224. Id. at 410.
225. Id. at 410 n.L
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may have been willing to allow discharge had some unforeseeable and unexpected financial downturn occurred.
In both Arterburn and Brasher, the bankruptcy petition was
filed so soon after the entry of the decree-four and twenty
days, respectively-that each court believed no other inference
could be drawn but that the debtor had defrauded his former
spouse. In In re Young 226 the debtor's petition was fied four
months following the entry of the decree, enough time to enable
the court to distinguish the case from both Arterburn and
Brasher.227 The Young court instead examined the factual circumstances other than the timing of the bankruptcy, holding
that the debtor had not made any misrepresentations, s and,
even if he had, that the creditor spouse failed to "show that
there was no reasonable basis to assure that29 the debtor would
perform at the time the promise was made.
In support of its determination, the court stated that, although "Mr. Young may have thought about bankruptcy before
entering into the agreement... there is no evidence that, at the
time the divorce decree was entered, he did not intend to pay
the debts? 230 Although the court's conclusion may be absolutely
correct, the summary fashion in which it addresses the issue is
troublesome. Consideration of bankruptcy just prior to the divorce should not be so lightly dismissed because it is relevant to
226. Young v. Young (In re Young), 181 B.R. 555 (Bankr. E.D. Okla. 1995).
227. Id..at 558. The court also found that the debtor had 'paid substantially all the
debt he was ordered to pay in the agreed Decree of Divorce." Id.
228. Id.
229. Id. (citing In re Shear, 123 BR. 247 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1991). As previously
noted, the Supreme Court held in 1995 that the creditor must show justifiable, rather
than reasonable, reliance, which is a lower standard to meet. See discussion and case
cited supra note 211. Even under the more lenient justifiable reliance standard, the determination that Mrs. Young failed to show reliance would likely be the same. The
Young court reasoned that "Mrs. Young was in a position to judge the nature of the
Debtor's assets and could not have reasonably relied on anything the Debtor said!'
Young, 181 B.R. at 558. Although not entirely clear from the facts set forth in the opinion, the court seems to be making the rather troubling assumption that simply because
Mrs. Young was married to the debtor, she must have been fully aware of his financial
condition. This type of imputed awareness is not only unfair, it is not a factually supportable proposition. One survey found that 53 percent of wives polled leave all of the financial matters to their husbands. Kris McGovern, Women Who Leave Money Matters to
Mates Put Own Welfare at Risk, THE DENv. Posr, Apr 28, 1996, at 7. Another survey,
conducted in 1992, found that women are more likely to be involved in the day-to-day
money matters than in tax, insurance, or investment issues. Winifred Yu, Women Invest
for the Future, TwExs UNION, Sept. 29, 1996, at C1. This means that literally millions of
married women have little knowledge of the marital finances beyond, at best, the transactions that get recorded in their checking account register.
230. Young, 181 B.R. at 558.
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the debtor's intent.231 Yet, the Young court appeared disinterested in learning the extent to which the debtor considered filing for bankruptcy before the divorce was final and whether
that consideration led him intentionally to make false representations or to create a false impression on which the creditor
spouse relied.28 2 This is not to say that mere consideration of
bankruptcy should be dispositive. But at a minimum it should
serve as the basis for a more searching inquiry. A court should,
for example, examine whether the debtor had the ability to pay
the debts at the time the decree was entered, and whether there
has been a significant change in the debtor's financial condition
since the decree was entered. 233
The debtor's pre-divorce consideration of bankruptcy was
analyzed in a similarly inappropriate manner in In re Maune. 4
There, the court was persuaded against the creditor spouse
based on the debtor's testimony that he discussed the possibility
of bankruptcy only with people other than his wife. 23 The relevance of the fraud exception in the marital context is that the
decree is a sham because, while one spouse believed the settlement negotiations were undertaken in good faith, the other
spouse was contemplating bankruptcy. Maune turns this on its
head by requiring the creditor spouse to show that the debtor
specifically stated to her that he was contemplating bankruptcy.23 Under such an interpretation, the exception makes no
sense; such an admission by the debtor destroys the requirement that the representation be false.
231. See, eg., The GM Card v. Cox (In re Cox), 182 B. 626, 629 (Bankr. D. Mass.
1995) (An individual's intent, that most hidden of human attributes, is invariable ascertained from the surrounding circumstances."). It is important to note, however, that a
more searching inquiry would not have benefitted Mrs. Young. She testified that Mr.
Young had mentioned the possibility of filing for bankruptcy but that she did not believe
that he would do so. Young, 181 B.R. at 557. Thus, she likely could not have shown
reliance.

232. Although Mr. Young's daughter testified to conversations with her father in
which he stated that he would file for bankruptcy if there were too many bills because of
the divorce, the court disregarded that testimony as not credible. Young, 181 B.R. at 557.
Nor did the court appear concerned that the debtor reported more income on his previous year's tax return than that reflected in his W-2. Id. When one also considers that
the debtor's extramarital affair, id., seems to have been the cause of the divorce, it
would seem there is sufficient reason to question Mr. Young's intentions more fully than
the court felt necessary.
233. See Brasher v. Brasher (In re Brasher), 20 B.R. 408, 410 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn.
1982) (considering lack of change in debtor's financial condition since divorce in determining debtor had defrauded creditor spouse).
234. Telgmann v. Maune (In re Maune), 133 B.R. 1010 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1991).
235. Id. at 1013.
236. Id.
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In appropriate cases and when properly applied, the fraud
theory adequately serves the purpose of protecting the innocent
creditor spouse while remaining true to the fresh start principle
of bankruptcy. Bankruptcy is a public policy choice; as a society
we are willing to grant the "honest but unfortunate" debtor a
chance to start anew. The purpose of the fraud exception generally is to weed out those debtors who are shown to be dishonest
and therefore not entitled to the fresh start. The intent to
deceive remains the same whether the victim is the debtor's former spouse or his credit card issuer.
There is, however, an important difference between institutional creditors and the creditor spouse. A spouse is not in the
business of extending credit; she does not enter divorce proceedings after assessing her husband's credit rating, nor is she able
to spread her risk by simultaneously marrying solvent and insolvent husbands. Moreover, the harm to institutional creditors
will not exceed the amount owed; they need not be concerned
that they will emerge from the bankruptcy proceeding liable to
some third party who must be paid. But for the creditor spouse
a discharged debt owed to a third party creates a liability, for it
is she who must now pay.237 The creditor spouse is the most innocent, and the most vulnerable, of creditors.
Yet the fraud exception appears to afford greater protection
to the institutional creditors than it does to the creditor
spouse.2 For example, in some jurisdictions the simple fact of
either obtaining or using a credit card creates an implied repre237. There is, of course, the argument that the creditor spouse was liable all along
for the debt because she agreed at the time of contracting to be jointly liable with the
person who was then her spouse. While legally valid, this argument ignores the reality
of the creditor spouse. For example, the domestic relations court could have ordered that
the debtor indemnify the creditor spouse on their joint obligations because the creditor
spouse would lack the financial resources to pay the debt once the marriage was terminated. Moreover, until the bankruptcy, the creditor spouse was never solely liable on the
debt owed to a third party;, had the couple remained married, it is quite likely that his
income would have gone toward paying the bill along with hers. In any event, the
unique situation in which the creditor spouse may find herself once her former spouse
files for bankruptcy supports the conclusion that the Code, in its present form, places a
disproportionate and unfair burden upon the non-institutional creditor.
238. There are provisions in the Code that provide for more beneficial treatment of
the creditor spouse than the institutional creditor. For example, support payments made
to the creditor spouse or dependent children by the debtor within 90 days of the filing of
the bankruptcy petition are not considered preferential even though such payments technically fit the definition of a preference. 11 U.S.C. § 547(cX7) (1994). Perhaps more importantly, a creditor spouse's claims for payment of support are given priority under
§ 507(aX7). I note this simply in anticipation of any criticism that the Code actually provides more specific protections to the creditor spouse than institutional creditors.
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sentation that the user has the present intention or ability to
pay for the purchase.2 9 The Code itself expressly provides a presumption of nondischargeability for luxury goods or services and
for cash advances obtained by the debtor within 60 days of the
filing of the bankruptcy petition. ° No such protections exist
with respect to parties to the creditor spouse. Further, as noted
in the discussion of the Young and Maune cases, evidence that
the debtor had considered bankruptcy during the divorce proceedings was given little or no weight in determining whether
the debtor had committed fraud.2 ' 1 In the commercial context,
however, as one court has stated, "tihere is an inherent contradiction in contemplating bankruptcy, on the one hand, and a
representation that one has the ability and intent to pay for
goods purchased on credit, on the other. 242 That court went on
to state:
It is difficult to read the human mind as to the precise moment a person
'decides' to file bankruptcy... it is plain that one who presents herself
as a purchaser with good intentions should not be at the same time 'considering' bankruptcy... False pretenses need not be overt in uttering a
check with insufficient funds. I see no difference in uttering a credit card
with the transaction under the personal vacillation of the purchaser as to
whether or not he will or will not pay depending upon whether he will or
will not file for bankruptcy. Certainly there is no pure unadulterated intention to pay when the transaction is shadowed by a pall of indecision
as to whether bankruptcy will be filed. Business credit demands a more
honest state of mind and if there be reasonable doubt that payment will
239. See Anastas v American Savings Bank, 94 F.3d 1280, 1285 (9th Cir. 1996)
("When the card holder uses his credit card, he makes a representation that he intends
to repay the debt."); Sears Roebuck and Co. v. Naimo (In re Naimo), No. 95-456, 1995
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4413, at *4 (E.D. Pa. April 6, 1995) (stating it is "settled law" that,
upon creditor's showing debtor knew or should have known that he would be unable to
pay debts when charges made, court will infer misrepresentation with intent to deceive);
In re Moody, 203 B.R. 771, 774 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1996) ("no one can dispute that when
the card holder accepts the card he or she impliedly represents that he or she has the
intention to pay the charges incurred"); Citicorp Credit Svcs. v. Hinman (In re Hinman),
120 B.R. 1018, 1021 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1990) (use of bank card establishes element of
representation).
240. 11 U.S.C. § 523(aX2XC) (1994), which, in relevant part provides:
consumer debts owed to a single creditor and aggregating more than $1,000 for
"luxury goods or services" incurred by an individual debtor on or within 60
days before the order for relief under this title, or cash advances aggregating
more than $1,000 that are extensions of consumer credit under an open end
credit plan obtained by an individual debtor on or within 60 days before the order for relief under this title, are presumed to be nondischargeable.

24L See supra notes 226-37 and accompanying text.
242. Ohio Citizens Bank v. Satterfield (In re Satterfield), 25 B.R. 554, 558 (Bankr.
N.D. Ohio 1982).
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be made it borders on cheating and should not be condoned even though
Bankruptcy Courts are certainly designed to enforce the humane law of
discharge to aid bankrupts in a fresh start.m

Because the case law is extremely limited on the subject of
fraud in the context of a divorce decree, the question of whether
the bankruptcy courts would require a similar level of honesty
on the part of divorcing spouses remains unanswered. Still,
Young and Maune indicate that the standard will, in fact, be different. Without either concrete proof of an actual plan to file for
bankruptcy or the very narrow time frame that existed in
Arterburn and Brasher, the creditor spouse will have a difficult
time convincing the court that the debts are nondischargeable. 2 "
It would appear that all a debtor spouse need do is keep quiet
about his intention to file for bankruptcy and wait a few months
before filing.
Seeking nondischargeability based on the fraud theory requires diligence on the part of the creditor spouse and her attorney because, as pointed out in the above discussion of the cases,
courts have generally not been persuaded solely by the circumstances of the divorce itself2O The general lack of success in this
area should not deter the creditor spouse from raising the fraud
argument, particularly where the decree is the product of negotiations between the parties rather than a judicially determined
division of assets. Where the argument is substantially justified,
the fraud theory recharacterizes the decree as a financial transaction and allows bankruptcy courts to undertake an examna243. Id. (citing Nevada National Bank v. Schneider (In re Schneider), 3 B.I. 175
(1977), quoted in M.C. Prange Co. v. Schnore (In re Schnore), 13 B.R. 249, 255 (1981)).
244. Even a concrete plan on the debtor's part is extremely difficult for the creditor
spouse to prove, which she bears the burden to do. Attorney/client privilege protects any
conversations the debtor may have had with his attorney with respect to bankruptcy.
There is also the very practical problem of the creditor spouse's ability to discover with
which of his friends and family the debtor might have discussed bankruptcy.
245. In ascertaining the viability of the argument, practitioners could make use of
the § 341 meeting of creditors. In Brasher, for example, the attorney for the creditor
spouse asked the debtor at the first meeting of creditors whether he had intended to file
for bankruptcy, the debtor refused to answer, stating that his attorney advised him that
this information was protected by the attorney/client privilege. Brasher v. Brasher (In re
Brasher), 20 BR. 408, 409 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1982). This failure to answer, combined
with the suspect timing of the bankruptcy petition, likely led to the creditor spouse's
complaint. The attorney for the creditor spouse should also give a careful examination of
the debtor's schedules. The debtor might have listed as exempt property that might have
been owned during the marriage without the knowledge of the creditor spouse. Also, the
value or amount of the debtor's income or assets as listed on his schedules may materially differ from that which he disclosed during the divorce process. See, eg., Phillips v.
Phillips (In re Phillips), 187 B.R. 363, 370 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1995).
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tion with which they are more contextually familiar. In a factually appropriate case, the fraud theory gives the bankruptcy
court the opportunity to remove itself from the quasi-domestic
relations function that the domestic exceptions force upon it.
The court could then treat the decree for what it might truly
be-a financial agreement that was procured by the debtor's
fraud.
V. A PROPOSED RECONCILIATION
Congress must amend the Bankruptcy Code in a way that
truly protects the innocent creditor spouse from the potentially
devastating consequences of a post-divorce bankruptcy. Proper
and adequate protection lies in either of the following proposals.
First, Congress should simply except all domestic obligations
from discharge. In the alternative, Congress should create a presumption of nondischargeability for all domestic obligations, a
presumption that can be overcome only by the debtor's showing
of an adverse change in his financial circumstances that he
could neither foresee nor control.
My first proposal, that Congress except all domestic obligations from discharge, is the better of the two alternatives. It
simply removes divorce issues from the bankruptcy process, a
process that is in-suited for dealing with noncommercial obligations. If the past has value for predicting the future, it is unlikely that Congress will adopt such an all-encompassing
amendment to the Code.24 My belief that Congress will continue
to use the debtor's entitlement to a "fresh start" as a justification for preserving the possibility of discharging divorce obligations leads me to propose an alternative.
A presumption of nondischargeability serves several important purposes. First, the support/property settlement distinction
would be eliminated. The same would be true, of course, under a
blanket exception for domestic obligations, but any proposal for
reform that maintains the distinction would be meaningless.
Second, my proposal preserves the integrity of the state domestic relations court, whose authority is simply too easy to circumvent under the Code as it is currently written. A presump246. See Susswein, supra note 11; Cullen, supra note 45, at 462. Cullen suggests
that Congress is overly concerned that about "unscrupulous debtors who would enter
into a sham divorce in order to defraud creditors.7 Id. In an effort to assuage this legislative concern, Cullen correctly points out that "there are already many safeguards in
place in other sections of the Code to prevent or punish this type of behavior," including
the denial or revocation of the debtor's discharge and the extensive avoidance powers
granted to the trustee. Id.
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tion of nondischargeability will encourage more honest and
sensible divorce litigation because both parties will fully understand that their decree will likely survive a subsequent bankruptcy filed by either party. Understanding this, divorcing parties whose jointly held level of indebtedness is barely
manageable might decide that filing for bankruptcy prior to the
divorce would be a wise move for both. Similarly, parties will be
discouraged from using the bankruptcy process as a means of
attempting to rid themselves of domestic obligations with which
they disagree, or as a forum in which to prolong a hostile divorce battle.
Finally, a presumption of nondischargeability would make
clear that the creditor spouse is not the type of creditor with
whom the Code is generally designed to deal. At the same time,
however, a debtor who is truly in need of the fresh start could
receive it by showing an adverse change in his financial circumstances that he could neither foresee nor control. Moreover, the
creditor spouse is properly removed from the consideration. No
other creditor in bankruptcy is subject to the intrusive inquiries
made of the creditor spouse. My proposal shifts the focus to
where it belongs, on the party seeking bankruptcy relief
CONCLUSION

As it presently exists, the Bankruptcy Code fails to fully
recognize what is really going on in a post-divorce bankruptcy. It
is too easy for debtors to use bankruptcy as a divorce strategy,
whether to circumvent the authority of the domestic relations
court or merely to perpetuate the animosity of the divorce itself.
Concurrently, the Code makes the task of preserving the divorce
decree far too difficult for the debtor's former spouse, who becomes a mere unsecured creditor in the bankruptcy proceeding.
But as a creditor she is unique; she is not a bank, but a human
being. Having staked her financial future on a state court order
that she had every reason to believe was final, she finds herself
fighting for the very survival of the divorce decree in a forum
that is simply not designed to resolve divorce issues. In this new
forum, she must overcome the formidable policy of the fresh
start to which the debtor is entitled, using exceptions to discharge that have produced little more than judicial inconsistency, confusion, and uncertainty. The devastating reality of the
creditor spouse's plight is a product of Congressional design; it
is an expression of public policy. Members of Congress, many of
whom will likely never find themselves in the creditor spouse's
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circumstances, must at long last recognize and correct the patent injustice of their creation.

